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Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
company
)
Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political
subdivision in the State of Idaho,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CV .O C: 120887;ttl

Case No. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Fee Category: L3
Filing Fee: $88.00

Petitioner 917 Lusk, LLC ("Petitioner"), by and through its undersigned counsel of
record, hereby files the following Petition for Judicial Review related to actions of the City of
Boise City, as follows:

I.
NAME OF THE AGENCY AND APPLICATION FOR WIDCH JUCICIAL REVIEW IS
SOUGHT
1.

The name of the agency from which judicial review is sought is the City of Boise City
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(the "City"), a political subdivision of the State of Idaho having jurisdiction over land use and
zoning decisions within the City, by and through its City Council (the "Council").
2.

The application that resulted in the decision that Petitioner requests this Court to

review is CUP 11-00090, and the associated applications CFHl 1-00035, CFHl 1-00036, and
DRH12-00013 (collectively, the "Application").

II.
.JURISDICTION
3.

Petitioner is an "affected person" seeking judicial review of a decision of the City

(described below), as allowed by Idaho Code Title 67, Chapter 52 (Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act), Idaho Code Title 67, Chapter 65 (Local Land Use Planning Act), Rule 84 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or the ordinances of the City.
4.

The actions of the City described herein are subject to judicial review under Idaho

Code Sections 67-6512, 6519, 6521, and 6535.

III.
IDSTORY RELEVANT TO PETITION FOR .JUDICIAL REVIEW
5.

Petitioner owns certain real property located in the City commonly known as 917

Lusk Street.
6.

On or about November 28, 2011, The Michaels Organization (the "Applicant")

submitted the Application to the City for an exception to the zoned height to construct a student
housing project at 1004 W. Royal Boulevard.
7.

The change in height requested is nearly thirty feet above than the thirty-five foot

height allowed in the R-OD (Residential- Office with Design Review) zone where the proposed
project would be located.
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8.

The property where the proposed project would be located is directly adjac~nt to the

Petitioner's property.
9.

The Boise City Planning & Zoning Commission (the "Commission") was to

originally hear the Application.on February 6, 2012.
10.

Although several citizens in attendance had signed into to testify on the ma~ter, the

Commission approved the Application as part of the "Consent Agenda" without hearing any
testimony on the matter.
11.

On February 13, 2012, the Commission agreed to reconsider the applicatio~ and

received public testimony.
12.

At a March 5, 2012 hearing, the Commission approved the Applicant's requested

height increase.
13.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Council.

14.

The Council considered the appeal of the Application on April 17, 2012.

15.

On April 25, 2012, the Council issued its Decision Letter denying the appeal and

!
I

I

I

upholding the Commission's decision to approve the increased height.
16.

The Council's decision prejudices Petitioner's substantial rights.

v.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR .JUDICIAL REVIEW
17.

The City's decision to approve the Application and deny the appeal was in excess of

constitutional or statutory protections, in excess of the City's statutory authority, mad~ upon
unlawful procedure, not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
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18.

Petitioner reserves the right to amend and/or supplement this Statement of Issues to

include other issues later discovered, in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(d)(5).

VI.
DESIGNATION REGARDING TRANSCRIPTS
19.

The testimony and proceedings should have been recorded, and the City should have

possession of those recordings at its offices. Petitioner requests preparation of transcripts of the
Council, Commission, Design Review Committee, and Parks and Recreation Committee
proceedings. Petitioner agrees to pay estimated and final fees for preparation of certified
transcripts of the proceedings as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act.

VII.
ATTORNEY CERTIFICATION
20.

Attorneys for Petitioner hereby certify that:
A.

This Petition has been served upon the City, which is the local government
rendering the decision.

B.

\

Petitioner requests transcripts for the proceedings of the Council, Commission,
Design Review Committee, and Parks and Recreation Committee. Petitioner
agrees to timely pay the resulting estimate and fees as required by Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 84.

C.

Petitioner requests an estimated fee for preparation of the record. Petitioner
agrees to pay the estimated fee calculated by the City Clerk in accordance with
Rule 84(f)(4).
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WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for the following:
1. That the action of the Council upholding the Board's approval of the Application be set
aside, in whole or in part, that the Board's approval of the Application be set aside, in
whole or in part, and the Application be remanded to the Board for further proceedings in
compliance with the applicable statutes and ordinances;
2. An award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117 or other
applicable statute or rule; and
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DATED this 17th day of May 2012.
SPINK BUTLER, LLP

By:

12 · \ --A-::AL

Richard H. Andrus
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17 th day of May 2012, I caused a true and correct copy
of the above PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW to be served upon the following individuals
·
in the manner indicated below:
Boise City Clerk
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 1st Flr., Bldg. 1
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 500
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208/384-3711

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

Boise City Council
c/o Mayor's Office
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 3rd Flr., Bldg. 1
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 500
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208/384-4420

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

Boise City Attorney's Office
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 4 th Flr., Bldg. 2
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 500
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208/384-4454

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

V

·-\-½-: AL-

Richard H. Andrut"
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NO·-----;:::-=---z-:9-_,,_"(:lo
A...,.M_ _ _ _
R~I-~

'

l
'
Richard H. Andrus, ISBNo.
7171
JoAnn C. Butler, ISB No. 4170
SPINK BUTLER, LLP
251 E. Front Street, Suite 200
Boise, Idaho 83702
P.O. Box 639
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 388-1000
Facsimile: (208) 388-1001

AUG O2 2012
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY
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I.
STATKMENT OF THE PETITION
This is an appeal from the decision of the Boise City ("City" or "Boise") City Council
(the "Council") upholding the City's Planning & Zoning Commission's (the "P&Z
Commission") approval of a conditional use request for a height exception from the limitations
of the Boise City Zoning Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance" or "City Code"). The purpose of the
height exception will permit Royal Boulevard Associates LP ("Intervenor") to construct an
apartment building (the "Project") to a height exceeding the thirty-five height foot limit
applicable to buildings in the City's Residential Office District (with Design Review Overlay)
zone ("R-O zone" or "R-OD zone").
Petitioner, being an adversely affected neighboring property owner, contends that the
City's approval of the conditional use permit adversely affects Petitioner and the public at large
and is improper because: (i) the P&Z Commission erred in failing to follow the procedure
established by the City Code and consider testimony required to analyze whether permission for
a conditional use request was appropriate; (ii) the Council erred in failing to overturn the
decision of the P&Z Commission in clear violation of City Code Section 11-03-07.05.G; (iii) the
Council's decision to uphold the P&Z Commission's grant of the conditional use permit was not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; (iv) the Council's decision to uphold the P&Z
Commission's grant of the conditional use permit was made upon unlawful procedure; and (v)
the Council's decision to uphold the P &Z Commission's grant of the conditional use permit was
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 5
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II.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW
The Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code Sections 67-6501 to 67-6538, ("LLUPA")
allows an affected person to seek judicial review of the approval or denial of a land use
application, as provided for in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Idaho Code Sections
67-5201 to 67-5292 ("IAPA"). Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003). An
affected person is one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the
issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development. Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1) (a). A
conditional use permit is an appealable permit under LLUPA. Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147
Idaho 267,207 P.3d 998 (2009); Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 86 P.3d 494 (2004).
The decision of a zoning authority will be overturned if the Court finds that the zoning
authority's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are (a) in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon
unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). The requirements of procedural
due process apply to land use matters, including proceedings on conditional use applications.
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,254 P.3d 1224 (2011); Cowan v.
Board of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006).
The role of the reviewing court is to evaluate the process by which the zoning decision
was reached, consider whether substantial evidence supported the factual findings, and evaluate
the soundness of the legal reasoning advanced in support of the decision. Jasso v. Camas
County, 151 Idaho 790,795,264 P.3d 897, 902 (2011). The approval or denial of a zoning
application must be vacated when it is not accompanied by a reasoned statement plainly stating
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the resolution of factual disputes, identifying the evidence supporting that factual determination,
and explaining the basis for legal conclusions, including identification of the pertinent laws
and/or regulations upon which the legal conclusions rest must be vacated. Id.

III.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the decision to grant the conditional use request, and the Council's refusal to

overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was in excess of the City Code's authority of the
P&Z Commission and the Council.
2. Whether the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the
Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was made upon unlawful
procedure.
3. Whether the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the
Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
4. Whether the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the
Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion.
5. Whether the "Reason for the Decision" Issued by the P&Z Commission and approved as
modified by the Council were inadequate under LLUPA and City Code, and thereby violated
Petitioner's due process rights.

IV.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
On or about November 28, 2011, the Intervenor's predecessor in interest, the Michaels
Organization ("Applicant"), filed an application with the City requesting approval of a

PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 7
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conditional use for a height exception to build a student housing project at 1004 West Royal
Boulevard in Boise, Idaho. BC-181 to 193. 1
The P&Z Commission is empowered to grant conditional use requests after imposing any
conditions needed to mitigate any damages, hazards, nuisances, or other detriments to persons or
property in the vicinity due to the proposed conditional use. Boise City Code ("BCC') §§ 11-0604.01 and 11-06-04.04. The P&Z Commission originally heard the application on February 6,
2012. BC-70, 195. Although two members of the public had signed up to testify at the hearing,
in error the P&Z Commission approved the Project as part of its "Consent Agenda" without
hearing that testimony. BC-70. To rectify the error, the P&Z Commission reconsidered its
decision and held another hearing. BC-70, 223. On February 13, 2012, the P&Z Commission
heard from City staff ("Staff'), Applicant's representatives, and Petitioner's representative. BC223 to 226. The P&Z Commission then continued the hearing to March 5, 2012. BC-226 to
227.
At its March 5 hearing, the P&Z Commission refused to consider testimony on adverse
impacts associated with the conditional use request and refused to appropriately condition the
request for a height exception as required under LLUPA and City Code. Idaho Code§ 67-6512;

BCC §§ 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.13, 11-06-04.14, and 11-06-06.12. Staff wrongly instructed the
P&Z Commission that: "The application tonight only concerns the additional height requested by
the applicant", and that potentially negative impacts, such as parking, were not an "issue before
the Commission." BC-112.

1

Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires references to the record to follow certain conventions. To avoid confusion, this
Petitioner's Brief uses the bates page numbering convention used by the City.
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The P&Z Commission then approved the conditional use application for a height
exception at its March 5, 2012 hearing. BC-106 to 111. On March 15, 2012, Petitioner timely
appealed the P&Z Commission's decision to the Council. BC-80. The Council held a hearing
on the appeal on April 17, 2012. BC-32 to 55. The Council denied the appeal and upheld the
approval of the conditional use for the height exception. BC-284 to 287. Petitioner thereafter
timely filed its Petition for Judicial Review.

v.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In fall 2011, Applicant applied to the City of Boise for permission to build a student
housing project at 1004 West Royal Boulevard in Boise, Idaho. BC-184 to 193. The proposed
Project consists of a housing structure for Boise State University students approximately 352,000
square feet in size and with a footprint that would occupy the majority of approximately 3.4
acres directly adjacent to the Boise River Greenbelt (the "Greenbelt"), Ann Morrison Park, and
Petitioner's property. BC-181, 195. The proposed Project would be located in the City's R-OD
zone. BC-195.
The City's Zoning Ordinance prohibits buildings over thirty-five feet in the R-OD zone.

BCC § 11-04-05.05; Table 2. Applicant could only construct the Project at its proposed height of
between fifty-nine and sixty-three feet- nearly double the thirty-five-foot height allowed in the
R-OD zone-if the City permitted the additional height after analyzing this now conditional use
under the City Code process. BC-70; BCC §§ 11-04-05.05, 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.13, 11-0604.14, and 11-06-06.12.
The 1997 Boise City Comprehensive Plan (the "Comprehensive Plan") was in effect at
the time Applicant's application was filed. The Comprehensive Plan incorporates by reference
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the Downtown Boise Plan (the "Downtown Plan"). Comprehensive Plan p. 8-33. 2 The
Downtown Plan provided guidance for a strong "Implementation Program," Downtown Plan p.
xv et seq., including zoning amendments necessary to implement the Downtown Plan. Id. The
Downtown Plan stated that the "City should create and adopt a new Residential-Office (R-O)
zoning district. . .intended to serve as a transitional buffer between the CBD and adjacent
neighborhoods." Downtown Plan p. xvi. The City did create the new R-O zone. See, BCC § 1104-05. The implementation of the Downtown Plan involved the rezone of large portions of the
City's downtown in order to ensure downtown zoning would: "comply with and conform to
the ... goals and policies under the ... Downtown Policy Plan [; and] maintain and preserve
compatibility of surrounding zoning and development." Boise City Ordinance No. 5475. In
other words, the City's implementation program was undertaken to ensure the zoning of the
properties in downtown was in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan.
As part of the Downtown Plan's implementation program, the subject property was one
of many properties deliberately rezoned from a zone that would have allowed-by rightbuilding heights above thirty-five feet to the R-OD where building heights above thirty-five feet
are only allowed through the conditional use process. Boise City Council Meeting Transcript 04-

17-12_2 ("Transcript 4-17-12") pp. 3-4. 3 This was a striking change by the City. The City
consciously implemented the Downtown Plan by downzoning what had been the allowed the
height on many properties such as the subject property-immediately adjacent to the Greenbelt

2

The Comprehensive Plan was revised during the course of proceeding at the City. The Downtown Plan was, again,
adopted and incorporated by reference into the revised Comprehensive Plan. The 1997 Boise City Comprehensive
Plan and Downtown Plan have been provided to the Court for ease of reference.
3

Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires references to transcripts to follow certain convention. To avoid confusion, the
Petitioner's Brief uses the page numbering convention used by the City.
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and Ann Morrison Park. See, BCC § 11-04-05 .05; Table 2.2A; Transcript 4-17-12 pp. 3-4.
t:.,,

This implementing R-O zone does allow for some flexibility in height, but only with strict
compliance with the City's conditional use process.
As part of the Downtown Plan's implementation program, at the same time that the
subject property was rezoned to be consistent with the Downtown Plan, Petitioner's property,
which is located immediately east and south of the proposed Project and away from Ann
Morrison Park, was rezoned BC-81. Similarly, other properties in the vicinity not located
adjacent to Ann Morrison Park were also rezoned. Boise City Ordinance No. 5475. However,
Petitioner's property and these other properties were rezoned to a zone (General Commercial
with Design Review or C-2D) that maintained the same forty-five foot height that existed prior
to the rezone. Id.; see also BCC § 11-04-05.05. The City drew a line: properties along Ann
Morrison Park were only allowed a maximum height of thirty-five feet; properties further east of
Ann Morrison Park, were allowed a maximum height of forty-five feet. Transcript 4-17-12 pp 37. Again, it is not that the R-O zone properties, like the subject property, cannot be developed
above thirty-five feet. However, the developers of those properties, and the City, must first
conduct the conditional use procedure found in City Code.
Petitioner's building serves the employees of Keynetics and is a three-story Class A
office building located in the C2-D zone with a base maximum height of forty-five feet. BC228. Petitioner requested and received a conditional use permit for a height exception, which
varies the roofline for design purposes and to accommodate stair towers. BC-83. That
additional height, considered on its own merits as a conditional use, is not habitable space, but
rather serves design and aesthetic considerations. BC-83. On the other hand, the height
exception requested by Applicant would add two stories of residential units to the Project, which
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is double the number of residential stories the Project would include if it complied with the
thirty-five foot height limit in the R-OD zone. Transcript 4-17-12 p. 4; BC-141, 229 to 231, and
247.
At its March 5, 2012 hearing, on instruction from Staff, the P&Z Commission did not
consider adverse impacts of the Project due to parking. BC- 112. The overwhelming evidence
presented at the hearing and in written materials submitted to the P&Z Commission
demonstrated that the Project was severely under-parked and the parking would adversely impact
surrounding property owners. BC-123 to 124,229 to 231, and 247. The additional height
attributable to the conditional height exception would add two full stories of residences to the
Project above what is permitted as an allowed use under the City Code. BC-141, 229 to 231, and
247. The Project would contain 622 bedrooms and house at least 622 student tenants, but only
provide 280 parking spaces. BC-229 to 231, and 247.
Parking around the Project is already strained. Ann Morrison Park hosts a variety of high
traffic events throughout the year. BC-229 to 231, and 247. During the summer river floating
season, soccer season, and other sports seasons, parking in Ann Morrison Park and along Royal
Boulevard becomes heavily congested. BC-229 to 231, and 247. The inadequate parking will
make the proposed Project an undesirable place to live, adversely affect the businesses in the
area, and harm the public's ability to enjoy Ann Morrison Park and the Boise River Greenbelt.
BC-229 to 231, and 247. Students that cannot find parking within the housing Project will park
at adjacent properties, including Petitioner's property. BC-84 to 88. As a result, Petitioner and
other property owners will be forced to expend considerable time and resources policing the
parking on their properties. BC-229 to 231. Congested parking will drive customers away from
businesses in the area. BC-229 to 231.
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On March 5, 2012 the P&Z Commission approved Applicant's conditional use request
for a legal exception. BC-106-111.
On March 15, 2012, the Petitioner timely appealed the P&Z Commission decision to the
City Council. BC-80 to 95.
On April 17, 2012, the Council upheld the P&Z Commission decision. BC-284 to 287.
VI.
STANDING OF PETITIONER
"An affected person aggrieved by a final decision concerning matters identified in

Section 67-6521(1)(a), Idaho Code, may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have
been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by Chapter 52, Title 67,
Idaho Code." Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1) (d). An "affected person" means "one having a bona
fide interest in real property which may be adversely affected by: (i) the approval, denial or
failure to act upon an application for a subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other
similar applications required or authorized pursuant to this chapter ... " Idaho Code § 676521 ( 1)( a)(i). The action of the Council, upholding the P&Z Commission's approval of
Applicant's request for a height increase under the conditional use permit criteria, is a final
decision subject to judicial review. Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Committee v. City of
Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 39 P.3d 606 (2001).

Petitioner is an affected person having an interest in real property immediately adjacent
to the proposed Project and adversely affected by the approval of a conditional use request for an
increase in height. Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916,920,204 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009)
(adjoining property owner affected by increased housing density is viewed as an affected
person); Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. Of Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009) (standing
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satisfied by neighboring landowner); Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho
501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (standing satisfied by landowners affected by adjacent subdivision
development); Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d
116 (2005) (standing satisfied because petitioners might smell proposed wastewater treatment
plant over three miles distant); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) (standing
satisfied by rural home owners affected by resort development).
The most immediate, real, significant, and anticipated adverse consequence to Petitioner
and other property owners in the neighborhood (including the public who travel to and use Ann
Morrison Park) is the parking crisis created by the City's approval of an additional two stories of
habitable apartments over and above the allowed height of thirty-five feet in the R-OD zone - all
without appropriate conditions being placed on the conditional use request to ensure that adverse
impacts are mitigated. In fact, there was no discussion, no analysis, and no deliberation by the
City to review the potential adverse parking impacts caused by this additional habitable
apartments that are not allowed by right under the Zoning Ordinance.
The lack of deliberation by the City, and the failure of the City to attach appropriate
conditions to this conditional use approval (assuming, solely for arguments sake, that the
conditional use could even be appropriately conditioned so as to mitigate adverse impacts), will
devalue Petitioner's property, require time and expense for Petitioner to police parking on its
own property, inconvenience employees and visitors to Petitioner's building, cause similar
deleterious consequences to the neighborhood around the Project, potentially drive business from
the neighborhood, and cause adverse consequences for patrons of Ann Morrison Park.
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VII.
ARGUMENT
A. General Rules Regarding Conditional Use Permit Requests.

Conditional uses are land uses that a governing body previously determined includes
characteristics that might render the use unsuitable as requested by an applicant. Such
characteristics may include increases in height that increase habitable space and all the attendant
issues from the increase in the number of people residing on and parking their cars on or near a
particular piece of property.
Permission to develop a conditional use, cannot, legally, be granted without compliance
with LLUPA's enabling legislation and the City Code. Under LLUPA:
As part of a zoning ordinance, each governing board may provide by
ordinance . . . for the processing of applications for . . . special or conditional
use permits. A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the
proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject
to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the
ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services
for the proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan.
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a). The City adopted conditional use permit review procedures for height
exceptions. See BCC §§11-06-04, 11-06-06.12, 11-06-06.13, and 11-06-06.14.
The stated "general intent" of the Zoning Ordinance is to require conformity within
zoning districts, BCC § 11-04-02.01, and buildings in any district are to be used only in
accordance with the regulations established for that district. Id. In the R-0 zone, the City has set
a maximum height of thirty-five feet. BCC § 11-04-05.05. Roof line features in the R-O zone
are allowed to vary slightly above this maximum building height and within strict parameters.
BCC § 11-04-05.06.A. Any other extension of height above the thirty-five foot maximum is
possible only if an applicant obtains conditional use approval from the P&Z Commission. That
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P&Z Commission approval, if granted, "shall be based upon the criteria set forth in [BCC]
Section 11-06-04.13." BCC § 11-06-06.12 (emphasis added); see also BCC § 11-04-05.06.D.
A multifamily building in the R-O zone is an allowed use when it is built to a height of
thirty-five feet. A multifamily building in the R-O zone built above thirty-five feet is a
conditional use, and, by the City's own legislative determination, "[ c]onditional uses by
definition possess characteristics such as to require review and appraisal by the [P&Z]
Commission to determine whether or not the use would cause any damage, hazard, nuisance or
other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity." BCC § 11-06-04.01.
Review and appraisal by the P&Z Commission occurs at a public hearing,·and
"[f]ollowing the hearing, the [P&Z] Commission shall approve, deny or modify the application
for a conditional use permit, imposing any conditions needed to establish the findings of [BCC]
Section 11-06-04.11. [sic: 11-06-04.13]" BCC § 11-06-04.04 (emphasis added). Further, the
City requires the P&Z Commission, "in acting upon the application, shall provide that approval
of a conditional use permit shall be contingent upon c~mpliance with specified conditions."4
BCC § 11-06-04.14 (emphasis added). Once a land use- such as the proposed Project-has

been classified by the City as a conditional use, the duty arises for the P&Z Commission to
protect the public's welfare through rigorous compliance with the adopted procedures.
Conditional use permits by definition are not granted as a mere matter of course. The
City's Zoning Ordinance contemplates that a full hearing on a conditional use application will
occur. A hearing in which neighbors who know their neighborhood well, such as Petitioner, can
provide testimony to the P&Z Commission on potential negative impacts that the requested
4

The Zoning Ordinance (BCC § 11-06-04.14) actually specifies a list of conditions that, "without limitation" the
P&Z Commission is to use to condition any particular conditional use application to mitigate potential "damage,
hazard, nuisance or other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity." See BCC § 11-06-04.01.
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conditional use may impose on the neighborhood. A hearing in which the P&Z Commission
would take all that testimony and would review and appraise the application in light of that
testimony. A hearing in which the P&Z Commission would deliberate toward a decision using
that testimony and, if the conditional use request was approved, that approval would be
contingent on conditions of approval that would mitigate the adverse impacts of the conditional
use.

B. The P&Z Commission Erred By Not Following The City's Conditional Use
Procedure.
The procedure contemplated by the Zoning Ordinance was not followed in this instance.
Idaho Code Section 67-6512(a) enables local governments to establish, by ordinance, a process
for reviewing and appraising conditional use requests. The City established by ordinance that
procedure, but did not follow its procedure. Petitioner understands the judiciary will in general
defer to a local government's factual findings. In this case, the City refused to gather and
deliberate on many of the facts, all of which facts form the basis for conclusions of law set out in
the City's conditional use criteria. BCC § 11-06-04.13.
The conditions of approval attached to an approved conditional use request must include
those conditions the P&Z Commission determines will allow the P&Z Commission to reach the
following conclusions of law:
A. That the location of the proposed use is compatible to other uses in the general
neighborhood; and
B. That the proposed use will not place an undue burden on transportation and
other public facilities in the vicinity; and
C. That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and all yards,
open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking, loading, landscaping and
such other features as are required by this title; and
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D. That the proposed use, if it complies with all conditions imposed, will not
adversely affect other property of the vicinity; and
E. That the proposed use is in compliance with and supports the goals and
objectives of the Comprehensive Plan.
F. Multiple family building (any building containing more than 2 residential
units) must be designed to include features which add to the visual and
aesthetic appearance of the structure and help prevent a sterile, box-like
appearance ....
BCC § 11-06-04.13.
In acting on a conditional use permit application, the P&Z Commission "shall provide
that approval of a conditional use permit shall be contingent upon compliance with specified
conditions." BCC § 11-06-04.14; see also Idaho Code§ 67-6512(d). Among those conditions
that shall apply are "requirements for off-street parking." BCC § 11-06-04.14.C. Thus, merely
meeting the Zoning Ordinance's off-street parking requirements for an allowed use (as compared
to a conditional use) does not necessarily satisfy the off-street parking requirements that may be
needed after analyzing a particular conditional use request. The City must go through the
legislatively-demanded procedure to analyze whether parking must be conditioned. The
language of City Code Section 11-06-04.14.C requires an examination of the off-street parking
for any conditional use permit application. The P&Z Commission must consider all of the
particulars of the proposed Project, including parking, and, as necessary, attach conditions of
approval regarding off-street parking.
However, in this case, the P&Z Commission treated this conditional use request as
though the building, at the height requested, only needed to meet the parking standards
automatically applicable to allowed uses. The P&Z Commission concluded that:
The height exception will not adversely affect surrounding property owners as the building's
additional height does not allow for more units than the site's available parking .... The
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height exception allows for the applicant to maximize the number of units, while providing
for adequate parking.
BC-108. The purpose of the conditional use procedure is to take a rigorous look at the potential
adverse effects a particular conditional use request may have on its surroundings and condition
the request accordingly. In this case, the P&Z Commission did not go through that exercise but
made the conclusory statement that there was adequate parking in order for Applicant to get the
most units out of the site as possible.
On several occasions during the conditional use process and appeal, Staff asked the P&Z
Commission and Council to compare the Project to other buildings "in the area" of the Project
that are similar height to the proposed Project. BC-199, 213. In its efforts to conjure an image
of compatibility, Staff failed to explain that the buildings Staff specifically referred to are not
located in the same zone as the Project and are not located "in the area." BC-70, 82 to 83, and
199. In fact, one of the buildings referenced by Staff is across the river and two of the
buildings-the Morrison Center at sixty-three feet high and the Barnes Towers at seventy-four
feet high - are located nearly one-third mile from the proposed Project, across two major
roadways (9 th Street and Capitol Boulevard) on the Boise State University Campus, and most
importantly, in the "University" or "U" land use zone that allows, by right, a height of seventyfive feet. BC-83.
Staff also used the height of Petitioner's building and Petitioner's height exception to
claim compatibility between the proposed Project and the surrounding area. Yet Staff failed to
explain to the P&Z Commission that Petitioner's building is located in the C2-D zone away from
the public's park and on the other side of the zoning boundary that the City deliberately drew
when the City implemented the Downtown Plan. BC-83, 199; Boise City Ordinance No. 5475.
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Staff further failed to point out that Petitioner's height exception was judged on its own merits
under the City's conditional use procedure, which is what should be expected in this instance.
The Project, at the height requested, arguably may be compatible with other buildings in
the area. The issue is whether, at the height requested, the Project is adequately parked or must
be conditioned so that the Project "will not adversely affect other property in the vicinity." BCC

§§ 11-06-04.13.D and 11-06-04.14.C.
At its March 5, 2012 hearing, on instruction from Staff, the P&Z Commission refused to
consider adverse impacts of the Project due to parking. Staff instructed the P&Z Commission
that "[t]he application tonight only concerns the additional height requested by the applicant",
and that potentially negative impacts required to be considered for conditional use requests, such
as the need for additional on-site parking exacerbated by the additional two stories of habitable
space the height exception would permit, was not an "issue before the Commission." BC-112.
After the public testimony portion of the hearing was closed and the P&Z Commission began
deliberating toward a decision, Commissioner Stevens, the P&Z Commission chair, stated:
I want to remind the Commissioners that the parking issue tonight is not actually
before us. This Commission is not in position to make findings that require our
applicant to be held to standards above that which is in our code. That would be
arbitrary and would make the City be in some serious hot water, so I want to
make sure that when we have our discussion tonight. that we keep the parking out
of it. It is not before us.
BC-126 (emphasis added). Commissioner Story affirmed Commissioner Stevens' position and
stated that "parking is off the table." BC-126. The Commissioners were wrong to conclude that
discussion of parking would be "arbitrary." What was arbitrary was that the P&Z Commission
did not consider the potential negative effects and the possible need to condition the Project to
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provide additional parking. What was arbitrary was that the Project was treated by the P&Z
Commission as though it was an allowed use and not the conditional use that it is.
· Despite that the P&Z Commission was instructed to not consider the parking problems,
and despite that the P&Z Commission expressly stated that it would not consider the parking
problems, the "Reason for the Decision" prepared by Staff and approved by the Council stated
"the public record from the Planning and Zoning Commission meeting revealed a robust
discussion regarding parking." BC-285, 263, and 272-273. The statement contains no support in
the record and contradicts what the P&Z Commission said and did. There was no such
deliberation by the P&Z Commission.
The P&Z Commission acted upon unlawful procedure based on the requirements of City
Code Sections 11-06-06.12, 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.04, 11-06-04.13, and 11-06-04.14. Because
the P&Z did not even consider the evidence in the record related to parking, the conditional use
decision cannot be supported by substantial evidence in the record. Finally, the P&Z
Commission's express disregard for the parking problems when the City Code specifically
requires the P&Z Commission to consider parking effects on the surrounding neighborhood
demonstrates it actions were clearly arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
C. The Council Erred When It Upheld the P&Z Commission's Decision to Approve the
Conditional Use Permit.
City Code sets forth the procedure and standards for appeals from P&Z Commission
decisions: When "there is not substantial evidence to support the findings upon which the
original decision is based, the decision shall be reversed. The City Council shall substitute its
own findings when the findings from the [P&Z Commission] are not supported by substantial
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evidence." BCC § 11-03-07.05.G.4. Further, the Council may "remand the matter for further
proceedings if a "substantial procedural error has taken place." BCC § 11-03-07.05.G.6.
The Council upheld the P&Z Commission's approval of the conditional use permit based
on a completely incorrect statement of what occurred before the P&Z Commission. When the
Council deliberated on the appeal, the Council Member's statements show that the Council
Members were completely unaware that the P&Z Commission was instructed by Staff not to
consider parking issues and that the P&Z Commission expressly refused to consider and address
parking issues. Compare BC-285 with Transcript 7-14-12 pp. 35-37.
The statements from Council Members when they heard Petitioner's appeal on the P&Z
Commissioner's lack of thorough conditional use review and deliberation indicate that the
Council either missed the error of the P&Z Commission or that the Council found it incredulous
to think the P&Z Commission would not have deliberated appropriately. Council Member
Jordan stated: "there was no indication in the record of uh concern on the part of the
Commissions [sic] that they perhaps were not receiving complete information to deliberate
properly." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 35. Council Member McLean stated: "I saw on the record a lot
of conversation about parking .... " Transcript 4-17-12 p. 36. Council Member Clegg opined that
"I find it hard to believe that in this many hearings um if there were issues to be brought up that
they weren't brought up ... I'm convinced given the record at hand that the Planning and Zoning
Commission did fully uh consider those." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 37.
But, in fact, the P&Z Commission did not "consider those." No matter how much
evidence regarding parking was brought before the P&Z Commission, the P&Z Commission was
expressly instructed by Staff to not consider any of it and the P&Z Commission did not consider
the testimony. The Council was in error.
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The Council's approved "Reason for the Decision" states "the public record from the
Planning and Zoning P&Z Commission meeting revealed a robust discussion regarding parking."
BC-285. The statement is manufactured out of thin air. The statement is certainly not based on
the record which underscores the fact that no such "robust" discussion occurred. BC-112 and
BC-126. Hence, the Council's decision to uphold the P&Z Commission's approval violated the
standard of review set forth in City Code Section 11-03-07 .05. BCC § 11-03-07 .05. The P&Z
Commission's approval and the Council's decision to uphold that decision were made upon
unlawful procedure, not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
D. The P&Z Commission's "Reason for the Decision," Which the Council Approved as
Modified, Fails to Meet the Requirements of Idaho Code Section 67-6535 and
Violates Petitioner's Due Process Rights.
The "Reason for the Decision" issued by the P&Z Commission and approved as modified by
the Council simply fails to meet the basic requirements of a reasoned written statement required by
LLUPA. See BC-106-111, 263 and 284. Idaho Code Section 67-6535(2) provides:
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant to this
chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains
the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts
relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory
provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in
the record.
Idaho Code § 67-6535(2). The reasoned statement "must plainly state the resolution of factual
disputes, identify the evidence supporting that factual determination, and explain the basis for
legal conclusions, including identification of the pertinent laws and/or regulations upon which
the legal conclusions rest." Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,794,264 P.3d 897, 901
(2011). Due process requires that parties be afforded a meaningful opportunity for judicial
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review, and the "reasoned statement" requirement means that decision-makers must articulate the
basis for their decision to permit meaningful judicial review. Id. at 797,264 P:3d at 904.

In the present case, the P&Z Commission expressly refused to resolve factual disputes in
the conditional use procedure. For the P&Z Commission, using parking as the example, granting
Applicant's height exception request "allows for the applicant to maximize the number of units",
BC -108, and justifies this through the conclusory statement that Applicant is "providing
adequate parking." Id. Because the P&Z Commission committed that foundational error, the
written findings do not reflect the standard set forth in Idaho Code Section 67-6535 as further
explained in Jasso.
The Council, in issuing its own "Reason for the Decision" that adopted the P&Z
Commission statements, compounded the error. BC-284 to 287. The Council not only ignored
the correct procedure for reviewing a conditional use as well as the factual evidence presented to
the P&Z Commission regarding the parking problems, but it also completely ignored what the
record clearly showed-that the P&Z Commission had refused to consider parking and the
adverse effects created by the Project. Merely stating that a "robust" discussion occurred at the
P&Z Commission level does not make it so. Such conclusory and false statements do not satisfy
the Idaho Code Section 67-6535 due process requirements to provide a meaningful judicial
review.

vm.
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED BY THE
CITY GRANTING THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT WITHOUT FOLLOWING
PROPER PROCEDURE.

The errors made in the City's decision to grant a conditional use permit to Applicant for a
height exception that will almost double the height of an adjacent apartment building have
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prejudiced Petitioner's substantial rights. As described above, Petitioner is an affected person
having an interest in real property that will be adversely affected by the approval of the
conditional use permit. Affected persons, such as Petitioner, hold a substantial right to procedural
regularity and due process.
"[E]veryone with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to a
meaningful notice and a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker." Hawkins v. Bonneville

County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,233,254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011) (citing Eacret v. Bonner
Cnty., 139 Idaho 780,787, 86 P.3d 494, 501 (2004); Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30,
36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010)). Additionally, "all the parties involved in a land-use decision
have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. Governing boards owe
procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their interested opponents. Both should expect
proceedings that are free from procedural defects that might reasonably have affected the final
outcome." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232,254 P.3d at 1228 (citing Noble v. Kootenai Cnty., 148
Idaho 937, 942-43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039-40 (2010)). Thus, due process and a procedurally fair
decision are substantial rights of a non-applicant petitioner. See Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233, 254
P.3d at 1228 (2011); Jasso, 151 Idaho at 794, 264 P.3d at 901 ("due process rights are substantial
rights") (quoting Eddins, 150 Idaho at 36, 244 P.3d at 180).
Throughout the administrative process at the City, the City sent Petitioner the message
that its participation in the process was nothing more than a nuisance-a bump in the road
toward approval of Applicant's request. Petitioner has a substantial interest in the outcome of
the application and was substantially prevented from meaningfully participating in the review
process. Most importantly, the City expressly refused to consider information required under the
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procedure established in the City's own Zoning Ordinance for review and conditioning of a
conditional use permit. BCC §§ 11-06-04.01, 11-06-04.13, 11-06-04.14.C, and 11-06-06.12.
The City violated Petitioner's due process rights by failing to adopt adequate findings of
fact to show support for the conclusions of law the City is required to reach under City Code.
BCC § 11-06-04.13; see also BCC § 11-06-04.14. The City specifically did not address the

conditional use criteria established in City Code. The failure to adopt such findings and
conclusions, alone, is sufficient to prejudice a substantial right of Petitioners. Jasso v. Camas
City, supra.

Finally, the City was required to attach any necessary conditions of approval to mitigate
any damages, hazards, nuisances, or other determents. BCC § 11-06-04.14. When the P&Z
Commission and then the Council just plain refused to consider parking, refused to recognize
and deliberate on the potential adverse impacts, even though such is required by City Code, the
substantial rights of Petitioner, specifically, and the public, generally, were violated.

IX.
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides that a petitioner in a petition for judicial review shall
be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees, witness fees, and other expenses when the zoning
authority acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) and (5). The
City acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law when the City failed to follow City Code
procedures for consideration of Applicant's conditional use request or provide written findings
that satisfy Idaho Code Section 67-6535. Under Idaho Code Section 12-117, Petitioner, as the
prevailing party, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. Idaho Code§ 12-117.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF - 26
000034

x.
CONCLUSION
The City committed procedural and due process errors that require the Court to vacate the
Council's decision and the P &Z Commission's approval of the conditional use permit
application. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court vacate the Council's decision and the
P&Z Commission's approval and remand the matter back to the P&Z Commission instructing
the P&Z Commission to consider all of the of the matters required by City Code Sections 11-0604.13 and 11-06-04.14. Petitioners also respectfully request an award of attorneys' fees as the
prevailing party.
DATED this 2nd day of August 2012.
SPINK BUTLER, LLP

By: :::2--:-\~.4<:..Richard H. Andrus
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of August 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above PETITIONER'S BRIEF to be served upon the following individuals in the
manner indicated below:
Boise City Attorney's Office
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 4 th Flr., Bldg. 2
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 500
Boise, ID 83701
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from the determination by the Boise City Council ("City Council")
upholding a decision by the Boise City Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") which
approved a conditional use permit ("CUP") for a height exception for Royal Boulevard
Associates, LP ("Intervenor") to build a multi-family apartment complex called the River Edge
Apartments ("River Edge"). 1
On March 5, 2012, the P&Z unanimously approved the River Edge CUP for .a height
exception and adopted reasons for the decision and conditions of approval.2 917 Lusk, LLC
("Petitioner") filed a timely appeal of the P&Z's decision to the City Council, asserting that the
P&Z decision failed to meet the requirements for a CUP. 3 On April 17, 2012, the City Council
denied the appeal and upheld the P&Z's approval of the height exception.4
The subject site is 1004 West Royal Boulevard, to the east of Boise's Ann Morrison Park
and to the west of the property owned by Petitioner. 5 Multi-family dwellings are an allowed use
for this location6 as the property is currently zoned as Residential Office with a Design Review
Overlay ("R-OD"). 7 The Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") 8 and the Boise City Zoning

1

R. pp. BC 284-287.
R. pp. BC 106-111.
3
R. pp. BC 82-89.
4
R. pp. BC 284-287.
5
R. p. BC-162.
.
6
Boise City Code § 11-04-05.04, Table 2.1.
7
R. p. BC-161.
8
Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 et seq.
2
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Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance") allow this use to exceed the base zoning' s standard height limit
of 3 5 feet with the issuance of a CUP. 9

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Does Petitioner have standing under Idaho Code § 67-6521 to seek
judicial review of the City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP?

2.

Did Petitioner challenge the City Council's approval .of the River Edge
CUP without a reasonable basis in fact or law thereby entitling
Respondent to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-11 7?

III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.

LLUP A allows judicial review of a final decision of a land use application for an affected
person, as provided in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAP A). 10, The issuance of
special or conditional use permits is allowed by Idaho Code § 67-6512(a), and includes
exceptions or waivers of standards for building height as addressed by Idaho Code § 67-6516. 11
Therefore, a party aggrieved by a decision of the City Council approving a conditional use
permit for a height exception may seek judicial review under the provisions of IAPA.

9

Idaho Code§ 67-6512(£); Boise City Code§ 11-06-06.09.
Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1)(d); In re Jerome County Bd. o/Com'rs, 281 P.3d 1076, _
11
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(£).

10

(2012).
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In its review, "The district court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." 12 "[T]he agency's factual determinations are
binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so
long as the determinations are supported by substantial, competent evidence on the record." 13
Regarding the Court's scope of review, Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) requires:
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by oilier
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
I

•

"There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of a governing board's zoning decisions,
including its application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinance." 14

B.

Petitioner has not established it has standing to seek judicial review of the
City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP, as required by Idaho Code §
67-6521.

A "fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence" is "that a person wishing to invoke a
court's jurisdiction must have standing." 15 In land use cases, LLUP A allows judicial review

12

Cowan v. Bd O/Com'rs ofFremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006) (paraphrasing Idaho
Code§ 67-5279(1)); See also, Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840,
845 (2007).
13
Fischerv. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,-352, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005) (quoting Price v. Payette County Bd.
of County Com 'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998)).
.
14
Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840, 845 (2007).
15
In re Jerome County Bd of Com 'rs, 281 P.3d
1076, (2012) (quoting Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term
.
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pursuant to IAP A for "affected person[s] aggrieved by a final decision" granting or denying a
development permit after ·exhausting all available remedies under local ordinances. 16

An

"affected person" is "one having a bona fide interest in real property which may be adversely
affected by: (i) [t]he approval, denial or failure to act upon an application for a subdivision,
variance, special use permit and such other similar applications required or authorized pursuant
to this chapter." 17 Standing in this matter depends on whether Petitioner can show real or
potential harm to Petitioner's property due to City Council's approval of the River Edge·CUP. 18
Despite all the cases Petitioner cites, 19 Petitioner has not met this burden and cannot be
considered an affected party for purposes of judicial review by this Court.
Petitioner cites numerous cases in an effort tor establish standing: Johnson v. Blaine

County,20 where the harm was a higher density than the underlying zone allowed; Taylor v.
Canyon County Bd of Com 'rs, 21 where the harm was in living adjacent to a property being
rezoned to a higher density; Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 22 where the harm
was in living adjacent to a property being subdivided and developed; Davisco Foods Int 'l, Inc. v.

Gooding County,23 where the harm could be the smell from development of a proposed

Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000)).
16
Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1)(d); see also, Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd o/Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d
1224, 1227 (2011).
Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1)(a).

17

18

Cowan v. Board ofCom 'rs ofFreemont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006).
Petitioner's Brief at 13-14.
20
146 Idaho 916, 920, 204 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2009).
21
147 Idaho 424,210 P.3d 532 (2009).
22
143 Idaho 501,509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006).
23
141 Idaho 784, 787, 118 P.3d 116, 119 (2005).
19
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wastewater treatment plant; and Evans v. Teton County,24 where the harm was in living adjacent
to a property being rezoned to accommodate a resort development. To claim "affected person"
status, Petitioner's only similarity with these cases is found with adjacency to the proposed
development. But adjacency wasn't the key detail of the cases above. "Proximity is a very
important factor," but standing status depends on being adversely affected - not being within a
specified distance. 25 .
In the case at hand, Petitioner is a landowner adjacent26 to a 3.42 acre parcel zoned ROD27 which allows the multi...family project the Intervenor seeks to build as an allowed use. 28
The Zoning Ordinance sets out the acceptable density for the subject parcel's R-OD zone29 - a
density which Intervenor is not asking to exceed.30 The Zoning Ordinance also establishes
standards which control how much on-site parking is required for that specific density in that
zone - again, standards which are met by Intervenor. 31 As such, it cannot be reasonably argued
that density and parking standards are the source of harm to establish Petitioner's standing
because, but for the height exception, Intervenor has a legal right to build River Edge without
any statutory review by Respondent nor any input from Petitioner. Therefore, if real or potential
harm to real estate interests are to be shown, as the case law requires, 32 then harm to Petitioner

24

139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003).
Id.
R. pp. BC 239-241.
27
R. p. BC 195.
28
Boise City Code§ 11-04-05.04, Table 2.1.
29
Boise City Code§ 11-04-05.05, Table 2.2A.
30
R. pp. BC 176-180.
31
R. p. BC 196.

2S
26

32

Cowan v. Board ofCom 'rs ofFremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006); Evans v. Teton
County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003).
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must surely originate from Intervenor's height exception- as it is the only part of the application
that is not already outright allowed by the Zoning Ordinance.
Petitioner's assertion of harm stemming from a height exception is imagined. For one,
Petitioner does not assert a legal claim to a view easement which Intervenor's building will
disrupt. Furthermore, despite so many pages of Petitioner's brief devoted to the topic, it does not
follow that the heights of 59 and 61 feet requested from the Intervenor translate into the parking
crisis Petitioner claims. There is no nexus or causal connection between the two elements and no
parking problem proximately caused by wanting a taller building. For example, the extra height
requested above the 35' which the R-OD zone allows by right could be merely aesthetic
preference.

Alternatively, the Intervenor could wish to have dwelling units with very tall

ceilings or have extra sound-proofing between floors or have a decorative spire that serves no
dwelling purpose whatsoever. Or, as is actually the case, the Intervenor could wish to build the
project over a first floor devoted to parking such that there are no actual first floor dwelling
units.33
It is neither sensible nor logical to believe Petitioner's real property could be adversely
affected by the River Edge height exception; height alone does not translate into a parking
emergency, despite Petitioner's insistence to the contrary. By contrast, Landowner applicants
"have a substantial right to develop their own property. " 34 LLUPA gives the City Council the
. authority to make decisions about CUPs for height exceptions. 35

Petitioner's desire for a

33

R. p. BC 164.

34

Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 233, 254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011).

35

Idaho Code§ 67-6512.
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different outcome in the matter does not equate to the adverse effect necessary for standing. For
these reasons, Petitioner's standing to challenge the River Edge CUP decision is lacking and its
appeal to this Court must be dismissed.

C.

Petitioner has not established that any substantial rights have been
prejudiced.

Even if this Court determines that Petitioner has standing to set this case in motion, Idaho Code

§ 67-6535(3) directs that, "Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or
violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or
reversal of a decision."36 The City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP must be affirmed
unless "substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced."37 Mere conclusory allegations
that property rights have been prejudiced are not sufficient to prove prejudice to substantial
rights. 38
While the Petitioner must show both an error under the standard of review set forth in
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and prejudice to substantial rights under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4),
"nothing in the IAPA requires the courts to address these two requirements in any particular
order."39 This Court can affirm the City Council's decision solely on the grounds that Petitioner
has not shown prejudice to substantial rights. 40 And it may completely "forego analyzing

36
37
38

Idaho Code§ 67-6535(3) (emphasis added).
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4).

39

Krempaskyv. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,235,245 P.3d 983,987 (2010).
Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232 (2011).

40

Id.
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whether the governing board erred in a manner specified by Idaho Code. § 67-5279(3) if
petitioner cannot show that his or her substantial rights were violated."41
Petitioner asserts that its substantial rights were prejudiced because of procedural
defects. 42 Since Petitioner's brief fails to identify any procedural flaw in the City Council's
approval of the River Edge CUP and makes no assertion of procedural error in the P &Z
.

approval, it seems Petitioner's argument rests on a claim that the City Council violated its due
~

process rights "by failing to adopt adequate findings of fact to show support for the conclusions
of law the City is required to reach under City Code.',43 In this assertion, Petitioner relies on

Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com 'rs44 and Jasso v. Camas County45 to elevate
displeasure in the outcome of the River Edge CUP into prejudice of a substantial right. But
neither of these cases transforms non-applicant Petitioner's basic rights of due process and
procedural fairness into substantial rights.
Contrary to Petitioner's claims, Hawkins makes a clear distinction between the permit
applicant and the non-applicant opponent on the subject of substantial rights, pointing out that
the non-applicant opponent cannot claim harm to a substantial right merely in the substantive
misapplication of an ordinance:
<.

[W]hen a petitioner opposes a governing board's decision to grant a permit
authorizing development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still show, not
merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights. Since a
party opposing a landowner's request for a development permit has no substantial
Id.
Petitioner's Brief at 24-26.
43
Petitioner's Brief at 26.
44
151 Idaho 228, 254 P.3d 1224 (2011).
45
151 Idaho 790, 264P.3d 897 (2011).
41
42
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right in seeing someone else's application adjudicated correctly, he or she must
therefore show something more. The petitioner opposing a permit must be in
jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a
reduction in the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use or
ownership of the land. It would be instructive to look to law relating to property
rights, nuisance, and trespass when determining if a substantial right is at stake in
a case such as this.
Thus, ( . . . ) it is not enough that Hawkins may be able to show that the County
substantively misapplied its own ordinance. The Board does not prejudice
Hawkins' substantial rights merely by incorrectly adjudicating someone else's
·
application for a variance. 46
Petitioner, as the non-applicant opponent in the case at hand, cannot claim harm to a substantial
right by asserting that the City failed to condition the River Edge CUP on Boise City Code § 1106-04.14. Hawkins is clear Petitioner has no such right to seeing Intervenor's CUP application
adjudicated correctly. 47
Petitioner's reliance on Jasso v. Camas County48 is equally flawed. In Jasso, the Court
found there was "utter failure" on the part of the Camas County Board of Commissioners to
provide a decision that could facilitate judicial review. 49 "Due to the inadequacy of the Board's
.· findings and conclusions, neither the district court nor [the Idaho Supreme] Court p9ssesses the
information necessary to meaningfully review the Board's approval of the preliminary plat

46

Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233 (internal citations omitted).
Respondent asserts the P&Z was never required, by the plain laµguage of the ordinance, to condition the River
Edge CUP on Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14. This is especially true in light of the parking standards set forth in
Boise City Code§ 11-10-01.01, Table 1, which were applicable to and met by Intervenor. If the language of an
ordinance is unambiguous (where reasonable minds do not differ nor are uncertain as to its meaning), an ordinance
is given its plain meaning. See, Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,798,264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011).
Had the P&Z been required to condition the CUP on Boise City Code§ 11-06-04.14, following Petitioner's logic,
the CUP would have been required to have conditions related to, for example, noise and vibration (see, § 11-0604. l 4(D)) and hours ofoperation (see, § 11-06-04.14(E)).
48
151 Idaho 790, 264 P3d 879 (2011).
49
151 Idaho at 797.
47
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application."50 The Court held in Jasso that, ''the Board's failure to provide a reasoned statement
for its decision prejudiced [the parties'] substantial right to due process."51.
It cannot be rationally argued that the City Council, after its review of the record and
consideration of extensive testimony about parking standards and parking concerns, 52 failed to
return adequate findings and conclusions or failed to provide a reasoned statement for its
decision of April 17, 2012. 53 At a minimum, the City Council could have simply adopted the
P&Z :findings and conclusions54 because Idaho Code § 67-6535 requires only that findings and
conclusions be made. 55 However on April 24, 2012, the City ·council did formally adopt its
Reason for Decision and Conditions of Approval clearly setting forth the elements considered,
the facts measured as important, the Zoning Ordinance standards used and interpreted, and the
site-specific conditions that were deemed necessary and appropriate for the River Edge CUP. 56
Therefore, Petitioner's reliance on Jasso to claim prejudice to its substantial rights is erroneous.
Petitioner has provided nothing more than conclusory allegations of prejudice to
imagined substantial rights. As such, Petitioner has failed to meet its burden under Idaho Code §
67-5279(4) and, regardless of any other facts argued, this Court can affirm the City Council's
decision and dismiss the Petitioner's appeal instantly. 57

50 Id.
51 Id.
52

R. pp. BC 121-122, 114-115, 125; Tr. Boise City Council Meeting (April 17, 2012) pp. 6-11, 17-19,21-23, 25,
27, 29-34.
53
See, City Council's Reason for Decision and Conditions of Approval, formally adopted April 24, 2012 at R. pp.
BC 284-287.
54
R. pp. BC 108-111.
55
Cowan v. Board ofCom'rs ofFremont County, 143 Idaho 501,511, 148 P. 3d 1247, 1257 (2006).
56
R. pp. BC 284-287.
57
See, Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232.
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D.

The City Council did not err in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 675279(3) when it approved the River Edge CUP for a height exception.

Because of Respondent and Intervenor's indistinguishable interests in this case, and in
the interests of brevity and ease of this Court's review, Respondent hereby concurs with and
adopts the arguments proffered by the Intervenor concerning the standards of Idaho Code § 675279(3) and Petitioner's failure to demonstrate error by the City Council. These arguments are
set out in Intervenor's Brief on pages 10-19, and Respondent adopts them in whole and with
minor additions, as follows.
In this appeal, except for the significant financial interests Intervenor alone has in the
matter, the Respondent and Intervenor possess identical interests in seeing the City Council's
decision of April 17, 2012, upheld. Petitioner's failure to address the applicable standards of
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), coupled with Petitioner's assertion of irrelevant58 or simply
unaddressed59 issues on appeal, left the Respondent and Intervenor wondering how best to relate
Petitioner's arguments to Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) so that the Court is not also equally confused.
Additionally, Petitioner's failure to address the applicable Zoning Ordinance sections of§ 1l-0604.13(C) and§ 11-10-01.01, Table 1,60 was mystifying to both Respondent and Intervenor.

58

Petitioner's arguments regarding the 1997 Boise City Comprehensive Plan and its inc01poration of the Downtown
Plan (Petitioner's Brief at 9-11) is perplexing since this legislative history is irrelevant to the City Council's
interpretation of its ordinances. Furthermore, Petitioner's second Issue on Appeal (Petitioner's Brief at 7) asserts
that the P&Z decision, and the City Council's refusal to overturn it, was made upon unlawful procedure. However,
Petitioner never alleges procedural error by the City Council, only disagreement with the City's interpretation of its
Zoning Ordinance. The P&Z decision is not subject to judicial review as it is not a final decision, pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 67-6521(d).
59
See, Petitioner's first Issue on Appeal (Petitioner's Brief at 7) regarding the P&Z decision and City Council's
refusal to overturn that decision as being in excess of the City Code's authority.
60
Boise City Code § 11-06-04.13(C) is the one of seven CUP standards which addresses parking: "That the site is
large enough to accommodate the proposed use and 'all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences. parking,
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In summary, the record before this Court is replete with substantial evidence of the City
Council's coming to a reasoned decision61 that this Court cannot now second guess. Upon
review, "[t]he district court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of~e evidence on questions offact."62
The City Council's performance of its duty as a quasi-judicial agency - by considering
how specific facts align with the standards o{ the Zoning Ordinance - is now "binding on the
reviewing court," even if there was conflicting evidence before the agency63 so long as the
determinations are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 64

Substantial and

competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion." 65
In addition to the burden of establishing both standing and prejudice to substantial rights,
I

Petitioner has the burden of proving that the City Council erred in at least one of the standards of
review set out in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). As noted above, "There is a strong presumption
favoring the validity of a governing board's zoning decisions, including its application and
interpretation of its own zoning ordinance. " 66 The P&Z ~as not required to adopt the specific

loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this title." (emphasis added). Boise Cify Code§ 1110-01.01, Table 1, sets forth the amount of parking "required by this title": 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit plus 1 guest
space per 10 units.
61
Tr. Boise City Council Meeting (April 17, 2012) pp. 34-40.
62
Cowan v. Bd. OfCom 'rs ofFremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006) (paraphrasing Idaho
Code § 67-5279(1)); See also, Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840,
845 (2007).
63
See, Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 109 P .3d 1091, 1094 (2005).
64
Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267,274,207 P.3d 998, 1005 (2009).
65
Wohrle, 147 Idaho at274 (quoting Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 43,981 P.2d 1146, 1153
u999)). .
Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840,845 (2007).
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findings and conclusions addressing the Zoning Ordinance CUP standards. 67 The City could rely
on the parking standards set out in its own Zoning Ordinance to decide the River Edge CUP for a
height exception was appropriate and well-supported by the evidence.

For these reasons,

Petitioner's claims must fail.

E.

Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Petitioner's request for attorney's fees was not properly pied in its Issues on Appeal68 and,
therefore, should be denied.

Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) requires that, "Any party seeking

attorney fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeai in the first
appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)."69
Appellant (Petitioner) is obligated to "indicate in the division of issues on appeal that appellant is
claiming attorney fees and state the basis for the claim."70

Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5)

requires the same formality of pleadings by the Respondent and, as such, has been set forth as an
Addition Issue Presented on Appeal, above.
Even if this Court determines the pleadings were adequate, Petitioner's demand for fees
is not warranted. Attorney's fees can only be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-117 if: 1.) the
Court finds in favor of a party, and 2.) the other party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. 71

According to the Idaho Supreme Court, it is necessary "to determine whether there was

67

Petitioner asserts numerous times that the P&Z and City Council were required to address each of the conditions
set forth in Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14. This assertion is not supported by law and is contrary to the plain
language of the ordinance. See Footnote 47.
68
Petitioner's Brief at 7.
69
IAR 41(a)(emphasis added).
70
IAR 35(a)(5)(emphasis added).
71
Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd o/County Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 660,664,214 P.3d 646, 650 (2009).
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no authority at all for the agency's actions."72 If an agency has no authority to take a particular
action, it is said to act without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 73 For the reasons argued herein,
the City Council was not acting outside the scope of its authority when it denied the Petitioner's
appeal and affirmed the P &Z approval of the River Edge CUP. LLUP A empowers the City
Council to take the action it took. Therefore, Petitioner should not be awarded attorney's fees in
this matter.

F.

Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117
because Petitioner challenged the City Council's approval of River Edge
CUP without any reasonable basis in fact or law.

The arguments presented herein and within the Intervenor's Brief establish that
Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees awarded by this Court. There is no basis in law for
Petitioner's continued insistence74 that the P&Z was required to make its River Edge CUP
approval contingent upon the specified conditions set out in Boise City Code § 11-06.:.04.14.
And the absurdity of that insistence is borne out in the way that some of the conditions of Boise
City Code § 11-06-04.14 are outright inapplicable to the River Edge CUP.

Following

·Petitioner's logic, the P&Z would have been required to add conditions related to, for example,
'

.

noise and vibration75 and hours of operation. 76

72

Wohrle v. 'Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267,276,207 P.3d 998, 1007 (2009) (quoting Ralph Naylor.Farms, LLCv.
Latah County, 114 Idaho 806,809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007)).
13
Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005).
74
Petitioner's Brief at 5, 8, 16, 18-21, 24.
75
Boise City Code§ 11-06-04.14(1)).
76
Boise City Code§ l 1-06-04.14(E).
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/

Petitioner has failed to provide any reasonable argument for this Court to overturn the
City Council's decision under the applicable standards of review in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).
The City Council has properly decided that the River Edge CUP approval was appropriate based
on the Zoning Ordinance and extensive testimony in the record and that the P&Z decision was in
no, way erroneous. This Court, in turn, should do the same because of Petitioner's failures as
outlined and the Court's deference to the City Council's interpretation of its laws. 77
"The purpose of Idaho Code § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary
, action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial
burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies should
never have made."78 Accordingly, Respondent is entitled to be reimbursed for its reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Petitioner's appeal should be denied, and the decision _by the Boise City Council to
uphold the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission should be upheld. The Petitioner
has failed to prove requisite standing and has failed to prove that any of its substantial rights
have been prejudiced in accordance with Idaho Code § 67-5279(4). In accordance with Idaho
Code § 67-5279(3), the Petitioner has not established that the City's action: violated
constitut~onal or statutory provisions; exceeded its statutory authority; was made upon unlawful

77
18

See, Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840, 845 (2007).
Neighbors fora Healthy Gold Forkv. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 143, 176 P.3d 126, 138 (2007).
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procedure; was not suppo~ed by substantial evidence; or was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion.

As such, the Respondent respectfully requests this Court affirm City Council's

decision and deny the Petitioner's appeal.
In addition, the Respondent requests an order granting it reasonable attorney fees against
Petitioner pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 as there was no reasonable basis in fact or law to
support the Petitioner's appeal.

DATED this 30th day of August, 2012.
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates, LP ("Intervenor") plans to build a multi-family
apartment complex called the River Edge Apartments ("River Edge") along the Boise River near
Boise State University ("BSU") and downtown Boise. 1 Multi-family housing is a permitted use
for this location under the Boise City Zoning Ordinance ("BCZO"). 2 The requested height for
River Edge is allowed upon Boise City's approval of a conditional use permit ("CUP") pursuant
to BCZO § 11-06-04 ("CUP Ordinance"), BCZO § 11-06-06.09 (allowing height exceptions by
CUP), and its enabling legislation, Idaho Code § 67-6512 within the Local Land Use Planning
Act, Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA").
The Boise City Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") approved a CUP for a height
exception for River Edge on March 5, 2012.

An adjacent property owner, 917 Lusk, LLC

("Petitioner"), appealed the P&Z's decision to the Boise City Council ("City Council"),
complaining that River Edge would obscure the view of Ann Morrison Park from Petitioner's
office building3 and arguing that the P&Z's decision did not satisfy certain CUP criteria. 4 On
April 17, 2012, the City Council upheld the P&Z decision based on the BCZO and the record of
the P&Z proceedings. 5 On May 17, 2012, Petitioner filed this judicial review action challenging
the City Council's decision.

P&Z Action Letter (3-6-12) ("Decision Letter''), pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111.
2

BCZO §§ 11-04-05.03 and 11-04-05.04.

3

Petitioner's Appeal Letter, p. 3, BC p. 83.

4

Petitioner's Appeal Letter, pp. 2-9, BC pp. 82 to 89.

5

City Council Decision Statement, BC pp. 284-287.
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II.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did Petitioner challenge the City Council's approval of Intervenor's CUP for
River Edge without any reasonable basis in fact or law thus entitling
Intervenor to attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117?

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Intervenor is part of a family of companies known as the Michaels Organization
("Michaels"), which is one of the nation's largest affordable housing developers. 6 River Edge is
intended primarily as housing for BSU students. 7 The project is ideally located for this purpose
in easy walking or biking distance of the BSU campus, next to the Boise River. 8
Michaels applied to the City for a CUP for a height exception on November 28, 2011.
After an initial delay, the matter was set for hearing on February 6, 2012, where the CUP was
approved. 9 However, two persons associated with Petitioner had left the hearing room and failed
to return to testify. 10 To ensure the City received their testimony, at a hearing on February 13,
2012, the City rescinded the approval and continued the hearing until March 5, 2012. 11
At the March 5th hearing, City staff informed the P&Z and the audience of the City staffs
and City attorney's interpretation of the City's ordinances. 12 In so many words, the staff stated
that the multi-family use meets the City's parking ordinance in Title 11, Chapter 10 of the City
Code (the "Parking Ordinance"), and that the additional parking issues are not before the P&Z as

6

Affidavit of Joseph Coyle in Support of Motion to Intervene, p. 2, par. 3.

7

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; City Council Decision Statement, BC p. 284; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 5,
in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 65, BC p. 198; Applicant Letter (11-28-11), p. 1, BC p. 181; Applicant Letter (2-27-12),
p. 1, BC p. 176.
Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; City Council Decision Statement, BC p. 284; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 5,
in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 65, BC p. 198.

9

Boise City Planning and Development Services Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 1, BC 134.

JO

Boise City Planning and Development Services Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 1, BC 134.

11

Boise City Planning and Development Services Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 1, BC 134; P&Z Hearing
Minutes (2-13-12), p. 4, BC p. 226.
12

Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12) p. 1, BC p. 112
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part of the height CUP .13 The P &Z followed the advice of staff and based its determin~tion of
parking requirements on the standards in the Parking Ordinance. 14 Nonetheless, Petitioner and
other parties submitted extensive testimony about parking at the P&Z hearing. 15
Petitioner th~n appealed to the City Council, which held a hearing on April 17, 2012. 16
Once again, Petitioner and persons supporting Petitioner spoke at length about their parking
concems. 17 City Council members discussed the concerns raised by Petitioner in some detail,
ultimately rejecting them. 18 The City Council's decision affirms the P&Z's decision based in
part on the City Council's interpretation that the standards in the Parking Ordinance control the
parking requirements for a height exception CUP .19

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Introduction.

Petitioner has the burden to establish (i) that when the City Council affirmed the P&Z's
approval of the CUP the City Council erred in at least one of the standards of review specified in
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3),20 and (ii) that Petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced in
accordance with Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4). 21 Petitioner has not met either burden.
13

P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12) pp. 1, 15, BC pp. 112, 126; Boise City Planning and Development Services
Memorandum (3-5-12), p. 2, BC 135.
14

P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 15, BC pp. 126.

15

Petitioner testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 9-11, BC pp. 120-122; Public testimony, P&Z
Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 13, BC p. 124.
16

Application for Appeal, BC p. 80; Petitioner's Appeal Letter (3-29-12), pp. 1-15, BC pp. 81-95; City
Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), p. 20, BC 51; City Council Hearing Minutes (4-17-12) p. 1-40; City Council
Decision Statement, BC p. 284.
17

City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 6, 9-10, 27, 29-31, 33-34.

18

City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 34-40.

19

City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 35-38; City Council Decision Statement, BC p. 284.

20

Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) provides:
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other provisions of
law to issue an order, the court shall affmn the agency action unless the court finds that
the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
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Petitioner's Brief fails to focus on the pertinent law, which has made it difficult to write a
responding brief.

Petitioner's arguments boil down to questioning whether the City may

interpret its ordinances to limit parking-related conditions that may be attached to a height
exception CUP to those standards set forth in the Parking Ordinance. Yet, Petitioner fails to
wrestle with the two provisions in the BCZO that control how much parking is required for a
height exception CUP: (1) BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) in the CUP Ordinance and (2) BCZO § 1110-01.01 (Table 1) in the Parking Ordinance. BCZO § 11-06-04.13 provides that the P&Z "may
approve a conditional use permit when the evidence presented at the hearing is such to
establish ... [seven standards]."22 Only one of these seven standards addresses parking: BCZO §
11-06-04.13(C), which provides:
That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and
all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking,
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this
title.
(emphasis added.) The parking "required by this title" for the proposed use is set forth in BCZO
§ 11-10-01.01 (Table 1), which requires 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit plus 1 guest space per 10
units. The undisputed evidence in the record shows that River Edge meets this parking standard
by providing 280 on-site parking spaces for 175 units. 23 With no basis in law, Petitioner tries to

(b)

in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c)

made upon unlawful procedure;

(d)

not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or

(e)

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
21

Friends ofFarm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002).

22

BCZO § 11-06-04.13 (emphasis added).

23

Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 3-5, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 63-65, BC pp. 196-198; Applicant Letter (2-2712), p. 1, BC 176; Applicant Letter (11-28-11), p. 1, BC p. 181; Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-

INTERVENOR ROYAL BOULEYARD ASSOCIATES LP'S RESPONSE BRIEF - 4

000066

sidestep these controlling ordinance provisions and recast the parking discussion largely as a
matter of procedural error or lack of substantial evidence.
Petitioner's Brief also fails to address the applicable bases for overturning a City Council
decision under Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), leaving the parties and the Court to try to relate
Petitioner's arguments to the applicable standards (which the following sections of this brief
attempt to do). For example, Petitioner states in its first "Issue on Appeal" that the P&Z's
decision and City's Council's refusal to overturn that decision was in excess of the City's
authority.· Petitioner's Brief at 7. However, no portion of the Argument in Petitioner's Brief
appears to address this issue. Further, the P&Z's action was not a "decision" on which "all
remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances" that is subject to judicial review. 24 Only
the City Council's decision meets this definition.
Similarly, Petitioner states in its second "Issue on Appeal" that the P&Z's decision and
City's Council's refusal to overturn that decision was made upon unlawful procedure.25
However, Petitioner never alleges any procedural error by the City Council. Petitioner argues at
page 17 of its Brief that the P&Z did not follow the BCZO's "conditional use procedure" by
declining to deliberate on testimony about parking and instead relying only on the Parking
Ordinance. However, this is not a procedural error at all, but simply Petitioner's disagreement
with how the City interpreted its ordinances. Even if this were a legitimate procedural error,

12), p. 3, BC p. 114. Further, Petitioner's Brief does not allege any deficiency with meeting this CUP standard and
Petitioner did not allege any deficiencies with meeting this CUP standard in its appeal to City Council.
24

Idaho Code§ 67-6521(d).

25

Petitioner's Brief at 7.
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which it is not,26 the P&Z's decision is not subject to judicial review and the City Council
considered the testimony in the record appropriately.
Throughout its Brief, Petitioner appears to assume without authority that the City was
required to consider the imposition of parking standards beyond the Parking Ordinance as part of
considering the CUP standards of compatibility or no adverse impact on other properties. Yet
Petitioner fails to provide any argument why the plain language of the CUP Ordinance and the
Parking Ordinance allow such an interpretation, and Petitioner fails to address why the City's
interpretation was "capricious, arbitrary, or unreasonable," 27 thus overcoming the "strong
presumption of validity" of the City's interpretation. 28
Petitioner clearly wishes the City had interpreted its ordinances differently. However,
Petitioner~s desire for a different outcome does not give rise to a legal error or create prejudice to
Petitioner's substantial rights.

Nor does Petitioner's desire for a different outcome entitle

Petitioner to file a Petition for Judicial Review without a reasonable basis in law or fact.
Petitioner fails to cite controlling legal authority (particularly the standards that govern
interpretation of the Parking and CUP Ordinances) and to provide sufficient argument to support
its claim that this Court must overturn the City's Council's decision. Petitioner has caused
unnecessary delay to the project and unnecessary expense to the City and Intervenor to respond
to the Petition. For the reasons described herein, Intervenor asks the Court to uphold the City
Council's decision and to order Petitioner to pay Intervenor's attorneys' fees.

26

As explained below, the P&Z followed all notice and hearing procedures for a CUP. Petitioner's
disagreement with the P&Z's interpretation of its ordinances as to applicable parking standards does not amount to a
procedural error, and, moreover, the P&Z properly applied the parking standards in the CUP Ordinance.
27

Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley ("Lane Ranch"), 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007)
(citing Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734,739,536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975).

28

In re Jerome County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 281 P.3d 1076 (Idaho 2012); Krempasky v. Nez Perce County
Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235, 245 P.3d 983, 987 (2010); See also, Noble v. Kootenai County ex rel.
Kootenai County Bd. ofComm'rs, 148 Idaho 937,940,231 P.3d 1034, 1037 (2010).
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B.

The City Council did not err in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67.
.
.
.
5279(3).

Petitioner's prayer for relief must fail because it has not demonstrated the City Council
erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), which provides the following standard
of review applicable to this action:
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(a)
in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(1;>)
in excess of the statutQry authority of the agency;
(c)
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
(d)
whole; or
(e)
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(Emphasis added). Because Petitioner has not established that the City Council has violated any
of the enumerated bases of error, the Court must uphold the City Council's approval of the
CUP. 29

1.

The City Council's approval of the CUP was not in violation of constitutional
or statutory provisions (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(a)).

Petitioner does not raise in its Issues on Appeal that the City Council's decision violated
constitutional or statutory provisions. 30 Thus, Petitioner cannot demonstrate any violation on this
basis and is now precluded from raising this issue in this appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court
refuses to consider "arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief." 31 Instead,
"[a] reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because

29

See, e.g., Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 452, 180 P.3d 487, 491 (2008); Fischer v. City of
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,352, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005); Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 134, 75
P.3d 185, 188 (2003).
30

• 31

See Issues on Appeal, Petitioner's Brief at 7 .
Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City o/Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,211, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).
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those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in
the respondent's brief."32
Without reference to either Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(a), the Idaho Constitution, or other
controlling legal authority, Petitioner generally asserts that the P&Z's "Reason for the Decision"
violated Petitioner's due process rights because the P&Z "refused to resolve factual disputes in
the conditional use procedure"33 and because the P&Z failed to adopt findings of fact addressing
the standards in the CUP Ordinance. 34 Even if this issue had been properly presented to this
Court, Petitidner's broad assertions regarding the P&Z's actions do not provide a basis under
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(a) for this Court to find that the City Council's approval of the CUP
was made in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. Moreover, Petitioner's general
assertions are incorrect.
When considering a CUP request, the P&Z is not required to resolve every factual
dispute or even to consider every fact presented in testimony, especially when it deems that
testimony irrelevant in light of specific, applicable standards set forth in the BCZO. Rather, the
P&Z is required to issue its decision in writing, along with a reasoned statement that explains the
relevant facts and law. 35 And, the "court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency
as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact." 36 As affirmed by the City Council on appeal,
the P&Z properly relied on the standards in the BCZO to approve the CUP.

32

Id.

33

Petitioner's Brief at 24.

34

Petitioner's Brief at 26 (Petitioner argues: "The City violated Petitioner's due process rights by failing to
adopt adequate findings of fact to show support for the conclusions of law the City is required to reach under City
Code. BCC § 11-06-04.13; see also BCC § 11-06-04-14. The City specifically did not address the conditional use
criteria established in City Code. The failure to adopt such findings and conclusions, alone, is sufficient to prejudice
a substantial right of Petitioners.")
35

Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2).

36

Idaho Code§ 67-5279(1).
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Additionally, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the P&Z is not required to adopt specific
findings and conclusions addressing each standard in the CUP Ordinance. The Idaho Code has
not required a P&Z decision document to be in the form of findings of fact and conclusions of
law since the Legislature amended LLUPA in 1999 to remove this requirement. Instead, as
noted, LLUP A requires a decision to "be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement"
that explains the rationale for the decision based on the relevant law and facts. 37 Both the City
Council and the P&Z adopted such a reasoned statement. 38 Thus, Petitioner's vague claims of
due process violations are unfounded.
Petitioner argues at pages 23 through 24 of its Brief that the P&Z's Reason for the
Decision fails to meet Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2), which provides:
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized
pursuant to this chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a
reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards
considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon,
and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual
information contained in the record.
(Emphasis added.) The P&Z adopted a reasoned statement that meets this standard. 39 It sets
forth the rationale for the decision based on what it believes to be the relevant law and facts, as
required by Idaho Code § 67-6535. The Idaho Supreme Court will uphold such a statement
when the decisionmaking body includes "the criteria and standards it considered relevant.. .. " 40
Specifically, as to parking, the decision statement concludes that the requested additional height
37

Idaho Code§ 67-6535(b); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 80-81 (2003).

38

Decision Letter, pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111; City Council Decision Statement, BC pp. 284-287.

39

Decision Letter, pp. 1-6. 3, BC p. 108-111.

40

Cowan v. Board of Comm 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 512, 148 P.3d 1274, 1258 (2006).
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "what is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of
what, specifically, the decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all of the evidence, to be the
relevant and important facts upon which its decision is based." Id. at 511, 1257. (emphasis added).
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will not cause the building to exceed applicable parking standards and thus will not adversely
affect surrounding properties. 41 Likewise, the City Council appropriately approved this decision
statement, as modified to require additional bike parking.
Petitioner has not established, or even properly asserted, that the City Council's approval
of the CUP violates any constitutional or statutory provisions. 42
2.

The City Council's approval of the CUP was not in excess of its statutory
authority (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(b)).

Petitioner fails to demonstrate or even address how the City Council's decision is in
excess of its statutory authority. On page 16 of its Brief, Petitioner cites to general standards
applicable to the P&Z's treatment of CUP requests, including:
•
•

•

The requirement for a public hearing;
The requirement for the P&Z to determine whether or not the use would cause any
damage, hazard, nuisance, or other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity;
and
The requirement for the P&Z to approve, deny or modify the application and to
impose any necessary conditions.

However, Petitioner's Brief does not demonstrate, or even allege, that these general requirements
were not met. Likewise, Petitioner did not raise this argument in its appeal to City Council.
In fact, the P&Z held a public hearing at which Petitioner, its counsel and its supporters
testified in person and/or in writing. The P&Z considered adverse impacts on surrounding
properties, and made a decision on the application with conditions the City deemed necessary to
allow the requested height exception. 43 The City Council considered Petitioner's appeal in

41

Decision Letter, p. 3, ~C p. 108.

42

Petitioner states on page 15 of its Brief that a CUP may not be granted without compliance with Idaho
Code§ 67-6512(a). This is not accurate, as this section ofLLUPA is an enabling statute that is only relevant to the
validity of the City's ordinance. LLUP A sets forth the terms that must be included in the City's ordinance and then
the City's ordinance controls. Petitioner is not challenging the validity of the City's ordinance and has not raised
any specific arguments that the City's decision did not comply with Section 67-6512(a).

43

P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 1-17, BC pp. 112-128; Decision Letter, pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111.
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accordance with the hearing procedures and standards set forth in the BCZ044 and found no error
with the P&Z's decision. 45

Thus, the P&Z and City Council acted within their statutory

authority.
3.

The City Council's approval of the CUP was not made upon unlawful
procedure (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(c)).

Petitioner's Brief does not cite a single procedural violation by the City. In fact, the P&Z
provided proper notice, held a public hearing (and even provided an additional public hearing to
accommodate Petitioner, who left the hearing room and missed the opportunity to testify at the
first hearing), recorded the hearing, and issued a written decision in the required format. 46
Petitioner also did not allege specific procedural violations in its City Council appeal, and,
regardless, the City Council found no procedural error in the P&Z's approval. Petitioner, its
counsel and supporter participated extensively throughout both the P&Z and City Council
proceedings.
Throughout its brief, Petitioner attempts to recast the fact that the City interpreted its
ordinances not to allow the imposition of parking conditions beyond those in the Parking
Ordinance as "procedural errors" for failing to consider Petitioner's testimony or failing to
follow CUP procedures. 47 These arguments are without merit. Petitioner's disagreements with
I

the City's interpretation of its ordinances and with the City's substantive decision do not
constitute procedural errors.
44

BCZO § 11-03-07.05.

45

City Council Meeting Minutes (4-17-12), pp, 34-40; City Council Decision Statement, BC pp. 284-287.

46

Decision Letter, pp. 1-6, BC pp. 106-111.

47

Petitioner claims the P&Z did not take a "rigorous look" at the potential adverse impacts of the requested
CUP on surrounding properties but instead "made the conclusory statement that there was adequate parking."
Petitioner's Brief at 19. There is no legal standard requiring a "rigorous" look, but nonetheless, the P&Z decision
demonstrates that the P&Z did consider the potential adverse impacts of the requested P&Z on surrounding
properties. Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108. Further, as to parking, the P&Z appropriately applied the standard set
forth in the Parking Ordinance and concluded, based on the undisputed evidence in the record, that the standard was
met.
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Petitioner has not established that the City Council's approval of the CUP was made upon
unlawful procedure.

4.

The City Council's approval of the CUP is supported by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(d)).

Petitioner fails to demonstrate how the P&Z's decision, upheld by the City Council, was
not supported by substantial evidence in the record. For the CUP approval as a whole, and for
each CUP standard, the record is ample.
The following summary of record support relates to those CUP standards challenged by
Petitioner in its City Council appeal 48 and in Petitioner's Brief. 49

a.

Compatibility to other uses in the general neighborhood.

•

There are numerous buildings of similar height in the immediate vicinity, including
Petitioner's own building next door that also received a height exception. 50

•

River Edge provides ample separation from shorter structures. 51

•

The additional height does not increase the density to the point it exceeds the parking
standards in the BCZO. 52

•

The additional height will not create privacy concerns given that adjacent uses consist
of offices and park land. 53

•

The additional height allows podium parking which creates a desirable aesthetic for
the neighborhood; it minimizes surface parking, creates a better streetscape, and
creates a more pedestrian friendly environment. 54

48

"[I]ssues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed."
Whitted v. Canyon County Board of Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 122, 44 P.3d 1173, 1177 (2002).

49

"A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are the
arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief." Marcia
T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203,211, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).
50

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (3-5-12), pp. 2-3, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 2-3, BC pp.
135-136; Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 6-8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 66-68, BC pp. 199-201; Applicant testimony,
P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 5, BC p. 116; Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 1, BC p. 112.
51

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 6, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 66, BC p. 199.

52

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201.

53

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC 108.

54

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC 108; Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 7, BC 118.
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b.

No adverse affect on other property in the vicinity.

•

River Edge will provide 280 parking spaces for 175 units to satisfy the Boise Zoning
Ordinance parking requirement of 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit and 1 guest space per
10 units. 55

•

The additional height does not increase the density to the point it exceeds parking
standards. This should prevent overflow parking from spilling into the
neighborhood. 56

•

River Edge parking is consistent with parking ratios provided by Boise State
University housing developments. 57

•

River Edge will promote the use of zip-cars and provide 5-6 stalls within the parking
garage for zip-car use, which may be rented by the hour or by the day. 58

•

River Edge will promote bicycle use, U-bikes and rental bikes and will provide
secured bicycle parking site. 59

•

The proposed building height does not obstruct pedestrian views of the river any
more than a 35-foot building would, and the pedestrian pathway mitigates this
impact. 60

•

The operating characteristics of the multi-family development do not conflict with the
surrounding uses. The area is comprised of other multi-family developments, office
and industrial uses that are of similar or greater intensity to River Edge. 61

•

The increase in traffic generated by the development is offset by the potential for
existing businesses to capitalize on the increase in customers to the surrounding
neighborhood as well as by access to bus stops and the greenbelt. 62

•

The traffic generated by this development is mitigated by its intended use as student
housing and the fact that the site is served by many modes of transportation. Boise

on

55

Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 3, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 63, BC p. 196.

56

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201.

57

Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 1, BC p. 112; Boise State University Parking Ratios for
Select On-Campus Housing Properties (3-2-12) (describing parking to bedroom ration range of .34-.54), BC p. 261;
Applicant letter (2-27-12), in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 43, BC p. 176 (describing 622 bedrooms and 280 parking
spaces for a parking to bedroom ratio of .45).
58

Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 4, BC p. 115.

59

Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 4, BC p. 115.

60

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 6, 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 66, 68, BC pp.
199,201.

61

62

Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201.
Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201.
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State University provides bus service only one block away, which runs every
20 minutes on weekdays. The project is next to the greenbelt, which allows a direct
walking/biking path to Boise State University, which is only ¼ mile away. 63
Petitioner's criticisms of some of this evidence (e.g., Petitioner's allegation on page 19 of
its Brief that some buildings used as a point of comparison for height compatibility have
different base zoning) do not provide a basis for this Court to overturn the City Council's
decision. "The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by
evidence in the record." 64 Further, Petitioner dismisses its own argument, stating on page 20 of
its Brief: "The Project, at the height requested, arguably may be compatible with other buildings
in the area."
Petitioner has not established that the City Council's approval of the CUP was
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.

5.

The City Council's approval of the CUP was not arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion (Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3)(e)).

Petitioner argues that the City Council's decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion because the P&Z did not consider parking effects on the surrounding neighborhood. 65
This argument has no merit.
As described above, the core authorities in this case are BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) (in the
CUP Ordinance) and BCZO § 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) (in the Parking Ordinance). BCZO § 1106-04.13 provides that the P&Z "may approve a conditional use permit when the evidence
presented at the hearing is such to establish ... [seven standards]." BCZO § 11-06-04.13

63

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 7, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 67, BC p. 200.

64

Whitted v. Canyon County Board ofComm'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002); See also,
Friends ofFarm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002).
65

Petitioner's Brief at 21, 23.
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(emphasis added).

Only one of these seven standards addresses parking:

BCZO § l l-06-

04. l 3(C), which provides:
That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and
all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking,
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this
title.
(emphasis added.) The parking "required by this title" for the proposed use is set forth in BCZO

§ 11-10-01.01 (Table 1), which requires 1.5 spaces per dwelling unit plus 1 guest space per 10
units. T~e undisputed evidence in the record shows that River Edge meets this parking standard
by providing 280 on-site parking spaces for 175 units. 66
The first step in interpreting an ordinance is to look at the plain language of the
enactment. If the language is unambiguous, the analysis ends there. 67 If the ordinance is
ambiguous, the City's interpretation is entitled to a "strong presumption of validity." 68 The
City's interpretation may be overturned only if it is "capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable." 69
The plain language of BCZO § ll-06-04.13(C) and BCZO § 11-10-01.01 (Table 1)
supports the City's decision that the standards in the Parking Ordinance control. The only CUP
standard addressing parking defers to the Parking Ordinance, which includes uniform standards
for all uses, a requirement of LLUPA. 70 Nothing in the plain language of the compatibility or

66

Staff Report (2-6-12), pp. 3-5, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), pp. 63-65, BC pp. 196-198; Applicant Letter (2-2712), p. 1, BC 176; Applicant Letter (11-28-11), p. 1, BC p. 181; Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-512), p. 3, BC p. 114. Further, Petitioner's Brief does not allege any deficiency with meeting this CUP standard and
Petitioner did not allege any deficiencies with meeting this CUP standard in its appeal to City Council.

61

Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Bd ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d
477,483 (1999).
68

In re Jerome County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 281 P.3d 1076 (Idaho 2012); Krempasky v. Nez Perce County
Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235, 245 P.3d 983, 987 (2010); See also, Noble v. Kootenai County ex rel.
Kootenai County Bd ofComm'rs, 148 Idaho 937,940,231 P.3d 1034, 1037 (2010).

69

Lane Ranch, 145 Idaho at 91, 175 P.3d at 780.

70

Idaho Code§ 67-6511.
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adverse impact standards requires the City to consider a different parking standard for a height
CUP. 71
Petitioner argues at page 18 of its Brief that the express parking requirement in BCZO
§ 11-06-04.B(C) - which falls within the City's conditional use permit standards - only applies
to allowed uses and not cqnditional uses. This argument is contradicted by the plain language of
the CUP Ordinance. As noted above, the P&Z "may approve a conditional use permit when the
evidence presented at the hearing is such to establish ... That the site is large enough to
accommodate the proposed use and all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking.
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this title." BCZO § 11-06-04.14C
(emphases added). Petitioner's provision of 280 on-site parking spaces for 175 units meets this
standard; therefore the P&Z "may approve" the CUP on that basis.
Even if the Court deems the CUP and Parking Ordinances to be ambiguous, the City's
interpretation is not "capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable." 72 At the outset, it is reasonable for
the City to rely simply on the express reference in BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) tying compliance to
the Parking Ordinance.

The City has adopted detailed parking standards in the Parking

Ordinance, which Petitioner has not challenged. The City quite reasonably is not obliged to
revisit those standards in reviewing every CUP and could reasonably conclude that a use meeting
the requirements of the Parking Ordinance will be compatible with its neighbors and will not
cause an adverse impact because the Parking Ordinance adequately ensures there will be enough
parking on-site not to adversely impact surrounding properties.
Further, the City could reasonably focus on BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) and discount the
importance of the compatibility and adverse impact criteria in this case because a height
71
72

BCZO § 11-06-04.13(A) and (D).
See Lane Ranch, 145 Idaho at 91, 175 P.3d at 780.
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exception CUP is an unusual form of CUP. The issue in this kind of CUP is not the use; the
multi-family use is an approved use in the R-O zone. Rather, the issue is only to assess the
impact of the height on surrounding properties. BCZO § 11-06-04.13(C) is directly relevant to
this consideration in that it focuses on the size of the site and places a natural limit on the height
because the developer can only include the number of units for which the required number of
parking spaces to serve those units will fit within the site.
The compatibility and adverse impact criteria that Petitioner alleges the City failed to
address do not have the same natural connection to a height CUP. These criteria make sense
when the permit is about use: e.g. is a warehouse, with the attendant noise, truck traffic and
hours of operation, compatible with residential neighbors? Does it have adverse impacts on
neighbors that can be mitigated through conditions in a CUP? When compatibility and adverse
impact are about height, the application of these criteria is more narrow: i.e. what impact does
the building height have on neighbors? The City addressed this issue sensibly by looking at
whether River Edge is a similar height to nearby buildings, which it is. Meanwhile, Petitioner
faults the City for not assessing a much more indirect connection, that more height means more
units means more parking means more impact means less compatibility. Yet, nowhere does
Petitioner demonstrate that it was "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable" for the City to conclude
that the adequacy of the parking is decided by the CUP and Parking Ordinance provisions that
specifically address this issue, as compared to provisions that relate only indirectly to parking, if
at all.
In short, no provision of LLUP A or the BCZO requires specific consideration of parking
for a CUP except as to whether the parking spaces required by the BCZO fit within the site-a
fact that is both true and unchallenged.

INTERVENOR ROYAL BOULEYARD ASSOCIATES LP'S RESPONSE BRIEF - 17

000079

Further, notwithstanding the clarity of the ordinances, the testimony and other evidence
in. the record reflects a substantial discussion showing the reasonableness of applying the Parking
Ordinance requirements to River Edge. As summarized above, River Edge will provide student
housing that will require parking in a ratio comparable to similar BSU housing developments. 73
River Edge promotes zip cars and bicycle use and is located adjacent to the greenbelt,
downtown, and Boise State University, with bus shuttle service to the campus. 74 And, the
additional height requested by the CUP does not increase the number of units to the point it
exceeds the BCZO's parking standards, which should prevent overflow parking from spilling
into the neighborhood. 75
The City Council reasonably interpreted all BCZO requirements for the CUP. Petitioner
has not established that the City Council's approval of the CUP was arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion.
C.

No substantial right of Petitioner has been prejudiced, as required by Idaho
Code§ 67-5279(4).

Regardless of any alleged error specified in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3), the City Council's
approval of the CUP must be affirmed unless "substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced." 76 Mere conclusory allegations that property rights have been prejudiced are not
sufficient to prove prejudice to substantial rights. 77 Petitioner has not met this burden and,
therefore, its prayer for relief must fail.

73

Staff testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 1, BC p. 112; Boise State University Parking Ratios
for Select On-Campus Housing Properties (3-2-12), BC p. 261; Applicant letter (2-27-12), in Staff Packet (3-5-12),
p. 43, BC p. 176.
74

Applicant testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), p. 4, BC p. 115.

75

Decision Letter, p. 3, BC p. 108; Staff Report (2-6-12), p. 8, in Staff Packet (3-5-12), p. 68, BC p. 201.

76

Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4).

77

Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,235,245 P.3d 983,987 (2010).
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Petitioner alleges its substantial rights were prejudiced because the P&Z granted the CUP
"without following the proper procedure." 78 . However, as discussed above, Petitioner has not
identified any procedural flaw in the approval and in fact all procedural requirements for the
CUP application and associated hearings were met. Petitioner's disagreement with the City
Council's interpretation of its own ordinances or with the City Council's substantive conclusions
does not create an unlawful procedure.
Petitioner also argues: "The City specifically did not address the conditional use criteria
established in City Code. The failure to adopt such findings and conclusions, alone, is sufficient
to prejudice a substantial right of Petitioners."79 As discussed above, the City is not required to
adopt specific findings and conclusions addressing each standard but rather must simply adopt a
reasoned statement that explains the rationale for the decision based on the relevant law and
facts, which it did.
Even though the P&Z was not required to consider (or even allow) testimony on topics
such as parking concerns given that the applicable parking standards were met, the P&Z did not
prohibit Petitioner from presenting such testimony, and both Petitioner and Intervenor submitted
a great deal of testimony and evidence regarding parking into the record. 80
Petitioner has not established how the City Council's decision to grant River Edge a
height exception, made in accordance with the BCZO, prejudices Petitioner's substantial rights.
Petitioner is not entitled to any particular view from its office building, and Petitioner has no

78

Petitioner's Brief at 24.

79

Petitioner's Brief at 26.

80

Petitioner testimony, P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 10-11, BC pp. 121-122; Applicant testimony
P&Z Hearing Minutes (3-5-12), pp. 3, 4, 14, BC pp. 114-115, 125; Petitioner testimony, City Council Hearing
Minutes (4-17-12), pp. 6-11, 27, 29-31, 33-34; Applicant testimony, City Council Hearing Minutes (4-17-12), pp.
17-19, 21-23, 25, 31-33.
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right to more process or stricter standards for a neighbor's CUP than are set forth in the BCZO.
River Edge meets all applicable setbacks and improvement standards, including parking.
D.

Petitioner is not entitled to attorneys' fees.

Petitioner argues it is entitled to attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 because the
City "failed to follow City Code procedures" and to "provide written :findings" in accordance
with the Idaho Code. 81 Petitioner's Brief does not indicate whether it seeks attorneys' fees from
the City alone or from both Intervenor and the City. We will allow the City to speak for itself,
but to the extent Petitioner seeks attorneys' fees from Intervenor, its request must be denied.
First, Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees was not properly pled in accordance with
applicable rules for a Petition for Judicial Review. Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) requires that the
attorneys' fees request be made "in the first appellate brief ... as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and
35(b)(5)."82 Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5) requires the appellant to identify its attorneys' fee
claim "in the division of issues on appeal." Petitioner did not include a demand for attorneys'
fees in its Issues on Appeal, 83 and therefore this Court should disregard this issue.
Second, even if this Court finds Petitioner's demand sufficient, an award of attorneys'
fees is not warranted under Idaho Code§ 12-117. "To award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117,
the Court must not only find that the Board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, but it
must also find in favor of the party requesting fees." 84 In assessing an award of fees under this
statute, the Idaho Supreme Court looks to "determine whether there was no authority at all for

81

Petitioner's Brief at 26.

82

A judicial review petition to this Court subject to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(r), which directs that
the Idaho Appellate Rules apply to any procedure not specified in Rule 84. Because I.R.C.P. 84 does not prescribe a
method for requesting attorney fees, I.AR. 41 (a) is applicable.

83

Petitioner's Brief at 7.

84

Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Forkv. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 138, 176 P.3d 126, 143 (2007).
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the agency's actions." 85 As set forth herein, the City Council had clear authority to affirm the
P&Z's issuance of the CUP, and Petitioner's claim that the City failed to follow City Code
procedures and to provide written findings have no merit.
Further, Intervenor's involvement in this action has been justified and premised on an
objectively reasonable belief that the relevant facts and law support the validity of the CUP. As
such, Petitioner's demand for attorneys' fees must be denied.
E.

Intervenor is entitled to attorneys' fees.

Intervenor intervened in this case to protect the substantial investment it has made in
River Edge and to avoid the cost of further construction delays. The analysis presented herein
demonstrates that Petitioner lacked a reasonable factual or legal basis to challenge the CUP. In
particular, Petitioner's argument that the P&Z was required to consider testimony about parking,
beyond the standards plainly stated in the CUP and Parking Ordinances, has absolutely no basis
in law. Further, the City Council properly determined that the P&Z decision was not erroneous
based on BCZO standards and testimony in the record.

Petitioner has not provided any

reasonable argument for this Court to overturn that decision under applicable standards for
review.
Accordingly, Intervenor is entitled to be reimbursed for its reasonable attorneys' fees
incurred in this appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-117(1), which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal,
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.

85

Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 276, 207 P.3d 998, 1007 (2009) (citing Ralph Naylor Farms,
L.L.C. v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806,809,172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007).

INTERVENOR ROYAL BOULEYARD ASSOCIATES LP'S RESPONSE BRIEF - 21

000083

The Court is authorized tQ award fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 tQ a prevailing
applicant/intervenor, which is a party for all purposes under applicable authority. 86

V.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner's argument that the City Council unlawfully affirmed the P&Z's determination
with regard to parking, or any other aspect of the CUP, has no reasonable basis in law or fact.
The City Council properly decided based on an interpretation its own ordinances and the record
of the case to uphold the P&Z's decision.
Petitioner has not met its burden to establish (i) that when the City Council affirmed the
P&Z's approval of the CUP, it erred in at least one of the standards of review specified in Idaho
Code § 67-5279(3), and (ii) that Petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced in
accordance with Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4). Therefore, this Court must affirm the City Council's
decision.
Intervenor respectfully requests this Court to affirm the City Council's approval of the .
CUP and to order Petitioner to pay Intervenor's attorneys' fees incurred in this appeal.

Attorneys for Intervenor Royal Boulevard
Associates LP
86

Draper v. Board of Comm'rs of Ada County, Case No. CV OC 0209940D, (4 th Dist. December 4, 2003)
(awarding attorneys' fees to intervenor) (attached hereto as Exhibit A): See also Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd of
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 846 (2000) (awarding attorneys fees against intervenor under Section 12-117); Gold
Hunter Mining & Smelting Co. v. Holleman, 2 Idaho 839, 27 P. 413, 414 (1891) (holding that intervenor's rights are
as comprehensive as the rights of the original parties to the suit).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

EDWARD A. DRAPER, and DEA J.
DRAPER, husband and wife,
Petitioners,

Case No. CV OC 0209940D

vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of ADA
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,

DECISION AND ORDER
ON APPEAL

Respondent,
and
BRIGHTON CORPORATION,
Respondents in Intervention.

BACKGROUND
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a petition for judicial review
filed by Petitioners Edward and Dea Draper (the Drapers). The Drapers are
appealing a decision by the Ada County Board of Commissioner (the Board)
approving a master site plan submitted by the Brighton Corporation (Brighton).
The Drapers are residents who live near property, owned by Brighton,
which is zoned M1, limited industrial. Brighton applied to the Board for
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-•
permission to build and operate warehouse buildings. The application went
through all the proper procedures and was approved by the Board in November
of 2002. The Drapers then filed this judicial review on December 18,,2002.

DISCUSSION
The Drapers first argue that the Board abused its discretion by not
considering compatible development issues. The Drapers concede that
Brighton's proposed project meets the minimum zoning requirements and fits
within the allowed uses for an M1 zone, but continue on to argue that the Board
failed to fully evaluate the compatible development issues.
The five specific objections alleging abuse of discretion presented by the
Drapers are light and lighting, noise, traffic, hours of operation, and whether the
actual use planned for the property will allow trucking activity that will have the
same impact on surrounding properties as would a terminal trucking activity,
which is prohibited in M1 zones. Regarding the first four objections, the record
has sufficient evidence to support the Board's approval of the project. The Ada
County Code established standards for lighting, as well as noise. The Ada
County Highway District found that the existing transportation system could
handle the additional traffic and the Brighton's plan provides for most of the
loading to take place indoors. The Board's decision will not be disturbed merely
because there is conflicting evidence in the record.
The Board properly reviewed substantial evidence, made sure the
standards in the statute were met, and did not abuse its discretion in approving
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-

the master site plan. Additional compatibility does not arise as an issue when
the proposal fits within the statute, as Brighton's warehouse proposal fits within
the statute.
Any further arguments regarding the specific standards allowed in an M1
zone and the comprehensive plan are issues of zoning and are untimely. The
land at issue in this proceeding was rezoned in March of 2000 and no appeal of
that decision was taken.
The Drapers second main argument is that the Board abused its
discretion in refusing to consider whether truck delivery uses included in
Brighton's proposed master site plan would have the same impact on
surrounding existing residential, agricultural, and commercial uses as truck
terminal operations that are prohibited in M1 zones. Brighton submitted a
proposal to use the land at issue for a warehouse. Evidence in the record,
including the design of the buildings, as well as testimony by an architect and a
real estate professional, supports Brighton's statement that the area will be used
as a warehouse. The proposed warehouse use is within the allowed uses for an
M1 zone. The Board was well within its discretion to approve the proposed
warehouse project and properly did not expand its perception of the proposed
project as that of a truck terminal.
Argument that the Drapers may have a future claim against Brighton
regarding the actual use of the property is just that, a future claim. Potential
problems are not yet ripe for judicial action. This Court will not consider
speculation as to the problems that may or may not arise.

I
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ATTORNEY FEES
This Court further finds that Brighton is entitled to reasonable attorney
fees. I.C. § 12-117. The petition, as brought by the Drapers, was without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. The approved proposal was admittedly within
the approved confines of an M1 zone and the argument that the warehouse
proposal is a truck terminal in disguise is fundamentally flawed. Brighton is
therefore awarded reasonable attorney fees to be paid by the Drapers.

CONCLUSION
The Board exercised appropriate discretion in approving Brighton's
application. Accordingly the Ada County Board of Commissioner's decision to
approve the master site plan submitted by the Brighton Corporation is
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

~

day of December, 2003.

D. DUFF MCKEE
Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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GIVENS PURSLEY
277 NORTH 6TH STREET STE 200
POST OFFICE BOX 2720
BOISE IDAHO 83701-2720
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
company,
)
Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political
subdivision in the State of Idaho,
Respondent,
and
ROYAL BOULEYARD ASSOCIATES,
LP, an Idaho limited partnership,

)
)
)
)
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)
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I.
SUMMARY
The issue before the Court is not confusing or complex, as the Respondent and Intervenor
would like the Court to believe. In the straight-forward terms of the Boise City Zoning
Ordinance ("Zoning Ordinance" or "City Code"), City Code requires the Boise City ("City" or
"Boise") Planning & Zoning Commission (the "P&Z Commission") to review, as a conditional
use, any request to exceed any height limit set forth in City Code, and that review and decision
must be based on the conditional use criteria set forth in City Code.
Conditional uses, by City Code definition (BCC § 11-06-04.01) "possess characteristics
that require review and appraisal by the Commission to determine whether or not the conditional
use would cause any damage, hazard, nuisance or other detriment to persons or property in the
vicinity" of the conditional use. The P&Z Commission is to appraise items set forth in City
Code-such as parking-and impose any conditions necessary to establish the findings for
approval set forth in City Code - such as appropriate conditions of approval related to parking.
The P&Z Commission violated the procedure set forth in City Code when it explicitly
refused to appraise and consider parking during its deliberations. No amount of public
testimony at the P&Z Commission hearings regarding parking can sanitize the P&Z
Commission's refusal to consider that testimony in its deliberations. The City Council
("Council") compounded the error when it deliberately ignored the record and upheld the P&Z
Commission conditional use approval to exceed the City-established height limit.
The appropriate course of action is for the Court to remand the application back to the
City, so the City can follow the procedure set forth in City Code. Petitioner's only request to
Council at its hearing in April 2012 was that the Council remand this matter to the P&Z
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Commission for the P&Z Commission to go through the portion of the City's process that the
P&Z Commission missed. Petitioner did not then, and does not now, ask for additional
process-just the process set out in City Code. Even today, the City could recognize this request
is still all that Petitioner asks and bring this matter back to the City for further proceedings on its
own determination. See Idaho Code§ 67-6510 (allowing the City to require mediation "at any
point during the decision-making process or after a final decision has been made").
II.
REPLY
A. The Council Erred in Upholding the P&Z Commission's Decision Because the
Commission Refused to Follow the Conditional Use Procedure Required Under City
Code for any Request to Exceed a Height Limit Established in City Code.

The Respondent and Intervenor base their entire response on the following erroneous
conclusion-City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) is the sole authority in City Code
concerning parking for a conditional use. This position is unsupported by the plain language of
City Code. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D; 11-06-04.14; and
11-06-06.09; see also 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) (providing parking standards for allowed uses not
conditional uses). City Code requires a review of parking and the impacts on property in the
vicinity of a proposed conditional use. The City failed to follow this procedure.

1.

City Code Provides a Clear Procedure for Reviewing a Request for Height Exceptions.
The language of City Code is clear and unambiguous regarding the procedure for

reviewing a request for a height exception. BCC § 11-06-06.09. A request for a height
exception must be based on all of the criteria set forth in Section 11-06-04.13. BCC §§ 11-04-
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05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 1 11-04-05.06.D;2 and 11-06-06.09. 3 Section 11-06-04.13
provides in pertinent part:
The Commission, following the procedures outlined below, may approve a
conditional use permit when the evidence presented at the hearing is such as to
establish:
A. That the location of the proposed use is compatible to other uses in the
general neighborhood; and
B. That the proposed use will not place an undue burden on transportation
and other public facilities in the vicinity; and
C. That the site is large enough to accommodate the proposed use and all
yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking, loading,
landscaping and such other features as are required by this title; and
D. That the proposed use, if it complies with all conditions imposed, will
not adversely affect other property of the vicinity; and
E. That the proposed use is in compliance with and supports the goals and
objectives of the Comprehensive Plan.
F. Multiple family building (any building containing more than 2
residential units) must be designed to include features which add to the
visual and aesthetic appearance of the structure and help prevent a
sterile, box-like appearance. Such features may include the use of brick
or stone, roof or facade modulation, planter boxes, bay windows,
balconies, porches, etc. The Commission or committee must make a
finding that specific design features have been added to enhance the
physical appearance of such multiple-family residential structures.

BCC § 11-06-04.13 (emphasis added). In addition to the review of the criteria set forth in Section
11-06-04.13, the P&Z Commission "shall provide that approval of a conditional use permit shall

1

Respondent and Intervenor conveniently omit Table 2.2A in their discussion about what constitutes an allowed use
and what is treated as a conditional use. Respondent's Briefp. 45; Intervenor's Brief p. 1. A multi-family dwelling
taller than thirty-five feet is not an allowed use. It is a conditional use in the R-OD zone.
2

Section 11-04-05.06.D provides "Height exceptions, except for roof line features meeting the standards of this
section, shall require a commission-level conditional use permit in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-0606.13 [sic] of the Boise City Code." BCC § 11-04-05.06.D.
3
Section 11-06-06.09 provides "Conditional use approval from the Planning and Zoning Commission is required to
exceed the height limits set forth in this ordinance." Therefore a conditional use permit that includes a height
exception must meet the requirements for conditional use permits and the Commission's decision on a height
exception "shall be based upon the criteria set forth in Section 11-06-04.13 (emphasis added). This does not mean a
few of the criteria in Section 11-06-04.13, but rather each and every criterion listed in the Section.
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be contingent upon compliance with specified conditions." BCC § 11-06-04.14 (emphasis
added); see also Idaho Code§ 67-6512(d). Among those conditions that apply are "requirements
for off-street parking." BCC § 11-06-04.14.C.
This does not mean that additional parking conditions must always be imposed for
conditional uses or that such conditions must always exceed the off-street parking requirements
for allowed uses found in the standard off-street parking requirements of City Code. It does
mean, however, that parking must be considered as part of the analysis of a height exception
request and, where appropriate, conditions related to parking imposed.
It is not sufficient for the P&Z Commission to consider only a few or even a majority of
the criteria in Section 11-06-04.13. In the present case, the P&Z Commission was required to
determine the proposed conditional use would not adversely affect other property in the vicinity.
That analysis includes whether parking would be sufficient. The P&Z Commission must at the
very least consider the criteria. The review necessary for a conditional use involves more than a
mere conclusion that City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) provides the appropriate level of
parking without considering the surrounding circumstances and any of the evidence and
testimony presented.
2. Table 1 of Section 11-10-01.01 Does Not Automatically Satisfy the Parking Review

Requirements for a Conditional Use.
Respondent and Intervenor claim the phrase "as required by this title" in Section 11-0604.13 .C limits the parking requirements for a conditional use to only those standards found in
City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1). Intervenor's Briefp. 15; Respondent's Briefp. 14.
This would be just plain silly if it were not an attempt by Respondent and Intervenor to read
conditional uses out of City Code. Section 11-06-04.13.C reads: "That the site is large enough to
REPLY BRIEF - 7
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accommodate the proposed use and all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences, parking,
loading, landscaping and such other features as are required by this title." The phrase "as
required by title" refers to the laundry list ofland use components listed in Section 11-06-04.13,
not the standards applicable to those land use components.
Respondent and Intervenor's argument ignore a basic rule of statutory interpretation that
requires all provisions of an ordinance to be read to give each effect. Poison Creek Pub. Inc. v.
Central Idaho Pub., Inc., 134 Idaho 426, 431, 3 P .3d 1254, 1259 (Ct. App. 2000). If, as
Respondent and Intervenor argue, a conditional use needs only to meet the off-street parking
requirements of Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) for allowed uses without any further review, the
language of Section 11-06-04.14.C related to off-street parking conditions would be read out of
City Code, violating this basic rule of statutory construction.
Further, Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) is not the only provision of "this" zoning title that
applies to parking. The parties have cited at least two sections of "this title" that are applicable
to off-street parking. The first is City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1), which Respondent
and Intervenor cite, that sets forth the standard off-street parking requirements for allowed uses. 4
The second is City Code Section 11-06-04.14.C that allows the P&Z Commission to include a
condition of approval for off-street parking for conditional uses. The two sections do not

4

Respondent and Intervenor attempt to separate the height from the multi-family residential nature of the proposed
conditional use. Respondent's Brief pp. 4-5; Intervenor's Briefp. 1. The two cannot be separated. The proposed
conditional use is for a height exception for a multi-family dwelling. A multi-family dwelling thirty-five feet or
shorter is an allowed use. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D. A multi-family
dwelling taller than thirty-five feet constitutes a conditional use. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table
2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D.
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contradict each other. They work side by side, with the former controlling the requirements for
allowed uses and the latter requiring a case-by-case analysis for conditional uses.
The P&Z Commission cannot merely plug a use into Table 1 of Section 11-10-01.01 and
call it appropriate parking for a conditional use without further deliberation. If that were the
case, there would be no need for Section 11-06-04.14.C allowing a condition of approval for
parking requirements. This makes further sense in light of Section 11-06-04.13.C, which
requires the P&Z Commission to consider parking, and Section 11-06-04.13.D, which requires
the P&Z Commission to determine that, if the conditional use complies with all conditions
imposed, the conditional use will not adversely affect other property in the vicinity of the
conditional use. The P&Z Commission would not need to consider parking and would not need
to attach a separate condition of approval tied to parking for the conditional use if all that is
required is a mathematical calculation under Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1).

3. The P&Z Commission Did Not Consider Any Evidence Regarding Parking and the
Council Ignored the Record Demonstrating This Error.
Respondent and Intervenor want the Court to believe that holding a hearing and allowing
citizens to testify is all that is required regardless of whether the P&Z Commission actually
followed the procedure and deliberately consider the testimony and evidence. This is an
unsupportable position.
The P&Z Commission absolutely refused to consider any evidence related to parking,
including the abundant evidence and testimony submitted by Petitioner that the Project did not
provide adequate parking for a structure of its height and would, as a result, adversely affect
other property in vicinity. BC-123 to 124,229 to 231, and 247. This refusal was based on the
same erroneous reading of City Code that Respondent and Intervenor continue to promote: that
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City Code Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1) contains the sole authority for evaluating parking for a
conditional use.
The record is replete with evidence showing the P&Z Commission refused to consider
parking impacts. City planning staff instructed the P&Z Commissioners that parking was not an
"issue before the Commission tonight." BC-112. The P&Z Commission Chair, Commissioner
Stevens, further stated at the beginning of deliberations:
I want to remind the Commissioners that the parking issue tonight is not actually
before us. This Commission is not in position to make findings that require our
applicant to be held to standards above that which is in our code. That would be
arbitrary and would make the City be in some serious hot water, so I want to
make sure that when we have our discussion tonight, that we keep the parking out
of it. It is not before us.
BC-126 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the statement above, what was arbitrary was not considering parking impacts
on the surrounding neighbors. If the P&Z Commission actually considered parking, it might
have determined that parking was not an issue under Section 11-06-04.13 and, assuming there
was evidence to support its conclusion, declined to attach additional off-street parking conditions
as provided by Section 11-06-04.14. By refusing to even deliberate on parking, the P&Z
Commission acted upon unlawful procedure and, as a result, did not consider the evidence in the
record. The P&Z Commission's acts were clearly arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion.
The Council propagated this error by failing to remand the application to the P&Z
Commission for consideration of the parking. More troubling is the fact that the record directly
contradicts Council's approved "Reason for the Decision," which states "the public record from
the Planning and Zoning Commission meeting revealed a robust discussion regarding parking."
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BC-285. No robust discussion occurred. BC-112 and BC-126. Merely allowing Petitioner to
submit information and testimony regarding parking does not satisfy the procedural requirement
that the P&Z Commission actually consider parking and the possible adverse effect on property
in the vicinity and deliberate toward an appropriate decision.
The Council did not remand the application to the P&Z Commission and did not make
any effort on its own to examine the evidence related to parking. In fact, the Council completely
ignored the error that occurred by the P&Z Commission and the record that showed this to be the
case. Council Member Jordan stated: "there was no indication in the record of uh concern on
the part of the Commissions [sic] that they perhaps were not receiving complete information to
deliberate properly." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 35. Council Member McLean stated: "I saw on the
record a lot of conversation about parking .... " Transcript 4-17-12 p. 36. Council Member
Clegg opined that "I find it hard to believe that in this many hearings um if there were issues to
be brought up that they weren't brought up ... l'm convinced given the record at hand that the
Planning and Zoning Commission did fully uh consider those." Transcript 4-17-12 p. 37.
The record directly contradicts the conclusions of the Council. The P&Z Commission
refused to consider any evidence about parking. By upholding the P&Z Commission's approval,
the Council failed to correct the violation and comply with the standard of review set forth in
City Code Section 11-03-07.05.5 The P&Z Commission's approval and therefore the Council's

5

Section 11-03-07.05.G provides:
"1. If the findings of fact upon which the original decision was based are supported by substantial
evidence, the City Council shall accept those findings.
2. If the City Council finds error on a factual finding, the City Council shall modify one or more of the
findings as warranted by the evidence or substitute its own findings, citing the evidence found that
supports the substitute findings.
3. If the decision is supported by the findings, but the City Council is not satisfied with the results in the
particular case, the City Council may direct appropriate amendments to the underlying policy or
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decision to uphold that decision were, accordingly, made upon unlawful procedure, not
supported by substantial evidence in the record, and arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion.
B. Respondent Describes an Incorrect Standard for Standing.
Respondent repeatedly states the wrong standard for standing. Respondent City of
Boise's Brief Opposing Petition for Judicial Review ("Respondent's Brief') pp. 6-10. Petitioner
does not need to prove damages to establish standing as alleged by Respondent. Rather, "[t]o
have standing in a land-use case, the petitioner needs to allege. not prove, only that the
development could potentially harm his or her real estate interests." Hawkins v. Bonneville

regulatory documents to apply to future applications, but may not modify, remand or reverse a decision
based on such future amendments.
4. If there is not substantial evidence to support the findings upon which the original decision is based,
the decision shall be reversed. The City Council shall substitute its own findings when the findings from
the review body are not supported by substantial evidence.
5. If the original decision is not fully supported by the findings, the City Council may:
(a) examine the evidence to determine whether additional findings could be supported, make those
additional findings and then review the original decision;
(b) make such decision as is supported by the findings; or
(c) uphold the review body, putting additional conditions on the application as warranted by the facts.
6. If a substantial procedural error has taken place, the City Council may remand the matter for further
proceedings.
7. Because the decision-makers below are experts having recognized expertise in their substantive areas,
the City Council shall give due consideration to a reasonable interpretation of a City ordinance adopted
by the review body.
8. The City Council may find error on the following grounds:
(a) The decision below is in violation of constitutional, State or City law. An example would be that the
review body's decision would be a taking or failed to comply with mandatory notice required under the
Local Land Use
Planning Act.
(b) The review body's decision exceeds its statutory authority. An example would be when there is no
authority for the decision in federal or Idaho law, or local ordinance.
(c) The decision below is made upon unlawful procedure. An example would be if notice of the hearing
was inadequate.
(d) The decision below is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. For the review body's actions to
be deemed 'arbitrary or capricious,' it must be shown that its actions were without rational basis; or in
disregard of the facts and
circumstances presented. Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary and capricious
when exercised honestly and upon due consideration.
(e) The decision below is not supported by substantial evidence."
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County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) (emphasis added) (citing
Evans v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003)). Petitioner clearly met this
pleading standard.
The foundation of Respondent's argument about why Petitioner does not have standing
rests solely on the same incorrect reading of the conditional use sections of City Code that lead
Respondent to claim the Project only needs to satisfy the off-street parking requirements for
allowed uses - which this is not - found in Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1). Respondent
essentially argues that because the Project meets the numerical requirements for off-street
parking of an allowed use under Section 11-10-01.01 (Table 1), there can be no potential harm to
Petitioner. See Respondent's Brief pp. 8-9. This conclusion flies in the face of the fact that the
City has legislatively-determined that an extension of set building height can trigger certain
externalities (such as those related to parking) on surroundings - including Petitioner's property
- that are unacceptable unless appropriately conditioned. The City, through its City Code, sets
forth factors, such as parking, that must be considered and, if necessary, need to be appropriately
conditioned - that is, to go beyond the numerics of off-street parking required for a building that
is not seeking an extension of height - to prevent harm to the surroundings. Here the P&Z
Commission refused to consider a factor that the City decreed that it must.
The most immediate, real, and adverse consequence to Petitioner and other property
owners in the neighborhood (and the public who travel to and seek to park on public streets in
order to use Ann Morrison Park) involves the parking crisis created by the City's approval of an
additional two stories of apartments - with parking tenants - above the allowed height of thirtyfive feet in the R-OD zone without even considering whether appropriate parking conditions
should be imposed to mitigate adverse impacts. Respondent would have the Court believe that
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the design of the building with first floor parking and four stories of habitable apartments would
not exceed the height limit if the first floor of parking were removed. Respondent's Brief p. 9.
This is not correct. BC-140 to 141. Further, Respondent would have the Court believe that the
taller building could just be a matter of the Intervenor's design preference with no attendant
parking problem due to that additional height. Respondent's Briefp. 9. How would the Court
know? Certainly not from the City, who has not provided the Court with deliberation of the
potential adverse parking impacts caused by this additional habitable space that is not
automatically allowed in this zone under City Code.
The lack of deliberation by the City, and the failure of the City to attach appropriate
conditions to the conditional use approval, will devalue Petitioner's property, require time and
expense for Petitioner to police parking on its own property, inconvenience employees and
visitors to Petitioner's building, cause similar deleterious consequences to the neighborhood
around the Project, potentially drive business from the neighborhood, and cause adverse
consequences for patrons of Ann Morrison Park. BC-229 to 231, and 247. Petitioner has clearly
alleged that the Project could potentially harm its real estate interests. Standing is satisfied.
C. The Substantial Rights of the Petitioner Were Violated When the P&Z Commission and
the Council Refused to Follow the Procedure Established in City Code for Approving a
Conditional Use.

Respondent and Intervenor correctly note that the Idaho Supreme Court has stated a nonapplicant petitioner must do something more than "show that the [decision maker] substantively
misapplied its own ordinance" to demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. Hawkins v.

Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,333,254 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2011);
Respondent's Brief pp. 11-12; Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates LP's Response Brief
("Intervenor's Brief') p. 19. However, Respondent and Intervenor ignore the rest of the
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Hawkins decision in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that a non-applicant affected party,
such as the Petitioner, holds a substantial right to due process and procedural regularity.
"[E]veryone with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to a
meaningful notice and a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at
233,254 P.3d at 1229 (citing Eacret v. Bonner Cnty., 139 Idaho 780, 787, 86 P.3d 494,501
(2004); Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010)). Procedural
regularity means more than notice and a chance to speak at a hearing. See Jasso v. Camas
County, 151 Idaho 790,796,264 P.3d 897, 903 (2011) (holding that notice and an opportunity to
be heard are not the only requirements of due process). "[A]ll the parties involved in a land-use
decision have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. Governing boards
owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their interested opponents. Both should
expect proceedings that are free from procedural defects that might reasonably have affected the
final outcome." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232,254 P.3d at 1228 (emphasis added) (citing Noble v.
Kootenai Cnty., 148 Idaho 937, 942-43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039-40 (2010)). Thus, due process and
a procedurally fair decision are substantial rights of even a non-applicant petitioner. Id. at 233,
254 P.3d at 1228.
In the present case, the P&Z Commission refused to follow the procedure required under

City Code to review and approve a request for a height exception. The Council then ignored the
record that showed that refusal. This is not a situation where Petitioner merely disagrees with
the way the City interpreted a particular parking standard under a City ordinance. Rather, this is
a situation where the City refused point blank to consider criteria required as part of the
procedure for reviewing a height exception application. In this case, the P&Z Commission
explicit refusal to consider parking at all violates the procedure set forth in City Code.
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The City's failure to follow City Code provisions at issue constitutes a procedural defect.
City Code Section 11-06-04.01 requires the P&Z Commission to review and determine whether
the proposed use, including parking, would cause any damage, hazard, nuisance, or other
detriment to persons or property in the vicinity of the Project. BCC §§ 11-06-04.01. The P&Z
Commission was then required to make specific findings related to the Project, including
whether the parking planned for the Project would adversely affect other property in the vicinity.
BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-06-04.13; and 11-06-06.09. Finally, the

P&Z Commission was required to attach any necessary conditions of approval, including offstreet parking requirements, to mitigate any damages, hazards, nuisances, or other detriments.
BCC § 11-06-04.01. The P&Z Commission did none of this.

The P&Z Commission not only failed to deliberate about the parking, but it explicitly
refused even to consider parking issues. When the P&Z Commission refused to consider
parking, which is required procedure under City Code, it violated the substantial rights of the
Petitioner and other affected parties.
The Council's decision to uphold the P&Z Commission's approval merely rubber
stamped what was already a defective process. The Council's decision also completely ignored
the plain record before the Council. Not only did the Council's decision run counter to the
substantial evidence in the record, but it wholly contradicted the only evidence in the record
involving the P&Z Commission's lack of deliberations about parking. For the Council to state
that the P&Z Commission reached its decision after a "robust discussion" ignores the record of
what actually occurred before the P&Z Commission.
The Council was in error. Hence, the Council's decision to uphold the P&Z
Commission's approval violated the standard of review set forth in City Code. BCC § 11-03REPLY BRIEF - 16
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07.05. Therefore, the P&Z Commission's approval and the Council's decision to uphold that
decision were made upon unlawful procedure, not supported by substantial evidence in the
record, and arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
D. Because the P&Z Commission and the Council Refused to Follow the Procedure
Established in City Code for Approving a Conditional Use, They Could Not Provide
Findings that Complied with Idaho Code Section 67-6535.

The plain language of City Code requires the P&Z Commission to address all of the
criteria set forth in City Code Section 11-06-04.13. BCC §§ 11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table
2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D; 11-06-04.13; and 11-06-06.09. When the P&Z Commission explicitly
refused to consider parking, the P&Z Commission deliberately chose not to consider a matter
that the City had legislatively-determined was relevant to be considered when appraising a height
exception request.
Intervenor claims the Council could ignore parking because parking was not relevant.
Intervenor's Briefp. 9. However, Respondent and Intervenor do not dispute that City Code
Section 11-06-04.13 is relevant. Because that Section, especially when read in conjunction with
other Sections of City Code (11-04-05.04 (Table 2.1) and (Table 2.2A); 11-04-05.06.D; 11-0604.13; and 11-06-06.09), mandate parking to be considered, the P&Z Commission had to
consider parking in order to make the necessary findings required pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 67-6535. When the P&Z Commission refused to consider parking at all, as is required
by City Code, it could not provide a "reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards
considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for
the decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance
and statutory provision, pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in
the record." Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2). The Council then perpetuated the error by failing or
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refusing to acknowledge what the record showed-that the P&Z Commission refused to follow
the procedure established by City Code.
E. Petitioner Is Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' fees.

Generally, the failure to include an issue in the statement of issues limits the ability of the
Court to consider that issue on appeal. State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d 298,
300 (1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992);
Crown v. State, Dept. of Agric., 127 Idaho 188,190,898 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1994) affd
in part, rev'd in part.. 127 Idaho 175, 898 P.2d 1086 (1995). However, this rule is relaxed where
the issue or issues were addressed by authorities cited or arguments contained in the briefs.
Prestwich, 116 Idaho at 961, 783 P.2d at 300; Crown, 127 Idaho at 190, 898 P.2d at 1101.
Petitioner's initial brief not only includes a clear heading stating that Petitioner requests an award
of attorneys' fees, but it also contains substantive argument and authority regarding why an
award is justified. The request for attorneys' fees is clearly before the Court, and the Respondent
and Intervenor cannot claim surprise or lack of notice. In fact, Respondent and Intervenor
responded substantively to Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees in their own briefs.
Respondent's Brief pp. 16-17; Intervenor's Brief pp. 20-21. No legitimate reason exists for the
Court to not consider an award of attorneys' fees to Petitioner due to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a).
Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees because the actions of the City lacked
a reasonable basis in fact and law. Idaho Code § 12-117(1) and (5). The City acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law when: (1) the P&Z Commission failed to follow procedures in
City Code for considering the height exception request and (2) the Council ignored the facts of
what occurred before the P&Z Commission. City Code clearly requires the P&Z Commission to
make a decision on a height exception request based on the conditional use criteria, which the
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P&Z Commission failed to do. The Council then ignored the record and failed to remand back to
the P&Z Commission for it do its job. Because the P&Z Commission and the Council clearly
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys'
fees.
F. Respondent and Intervenor Are Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' fees.

As set forth above, the P&Z Commission and the Council erred and acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. Therefore, the Respondent and Intervenor are not the prevailing
parties and are not permitted an award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Section 12-117.

VI.
CONCLUSION

Petitioner merely asks the Court to require the City to follow the procedure established in

-

its own ordinances. Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court vacate the Council's decision
and the P&Z Commission's approval and remand the matter back to the City for further
procedure.
DATED this 20th day of September 2012.
SPINK BUTLER, LLP

By:

V. \ -\-le-ALRichard H. Andrus
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of September 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above REPLY BRIEF to be served upon the following individuals in the
manner indicated below:
Boise City Attorney's Office
150 N. Capitol Blvd., 4 th Flr., Bldg. 2
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 500
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208/384-4454

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[X] Via Facsimile

Gary G. Allen
Deborah E. Nelson
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208/388-1300

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[X] Via Facsimile

Richard H. Andrus .7
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC~t11.1TY
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Petitioner,
vs.

a

CITY OF BOISE CITY, political
subdivision in the State of Idaho,

Respondent,
and
ROYAL BOULEYARD AS SOCIATES,
LP, an Idaho limited partnership,
Intervenor.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-OC-2012-08871
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

_______________

This is a petition, filed by 917 Lusk, LLC, an Idaho corporation, (Lusk) seeking
judicial review of a final decision of the City of Boise 1 granting a conditional use permit for
an apartment complex to be built by Royal Boulevard Associates, LP (Royal), which has
\

intervened in this case.2 For the reasons set forth hereinafter, the City's decision will be
affirmed.

1

The Boise City Council approved the conditional use permit during a city council meeting. The Planning and
Zoning Commission had previously held hearings and taken action, which formed the basis for the appeal
before the council. See Boise City Council Meeting 04-17-12_2 Minutes, at 1-2 (Josh Johnson (with the
planning department): "[W]e're here tonight to hear an appeal from 917 Lusk LLC for a height exception
associated with a multi-family structure located at 1004 West Royal Boulevard ... The Planning and Zoning
Commission correctly determined that parking was not before them as the project meets the parking
requirements of a multi-family unit.").
2

Royal Boulevard has filed a ''response brief' in this proceeding.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts and procedural history are derived from the City's and Lusk's
briefs:
This case is an appeal from the determination by the Boise City Council
('City Council') upholding a decision by the Boise City Planning and
Zoning Commission ('P&Z') which approved a conditional use permit
('CUP') for a height exception for Royal Bo~evard Associates, LP
('Intervenor') to build a multi-family apartment complex called the River
Edge Apartments ('River Edge').
On March 5, 2012, the P&Z unanimously approved the River Edge CUP for
a height exception and adopted reasons for the decision and conditions of
approval. 917 Luck, LLC ('Petitioner') filed a timely appeal of the P&Z's
decision to the City Council, asserting that the P&Z decision failed to meet
the requirements for'a CUP. On April 17, 2012, the City Council denied the
appeal and upheld the P&Z's approval of the height exception.
The subject site is 1004 West Royal Boulevard, to the east of Boise's Ann
Morrison Park and to the west of the property owned by Petitioner. Multifamily dwellings are an allowed use for this location as the property is
currently zoned as Residential Office with Design Review Overlay ('ROD'). The Local Land Use Planning Act ('LLUPA') and the Boise City
Zoning Ordinance ('Zoning Ordinance') allow this use to exceed the base
zoning's standard height limit of 35 feet with the issuance of a CUP.
Respondent City of Boise's Brief Opposing Petition for Judicial Review, at
4-5.
Lusk also notes the following facts:
In fall 2011, Applicant applied to the City of Boise for permission to build a
student housing project at 1004 West Royal Boulevard in Boise, Idaho. BC184 to 193. The proposed Project consists of a housing structure for Boise
State University students approximately 352,000 square feet in size and with
a footprint that would occupy the majority of approximately 3.4 acres
directly adjacent to the Boise River Greenbelt (the 'Greenbelt'), Ann
Morrison Park, and Petitioner's property. BC-181, 195. The proposed
Project would be located in the City's R-OD zone. BC-195.

The City's Zoning Ordinance prohibits buildings over thirty-five feet in the
R-OD zone. BCC § 11-04-05.05; Table 2. Applicant could only construct the
Project at its proposed height of between fifty-nine and sixty-three feet nearly double the thirty-five foot height allowed in the R-OD zone-if the
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City permitted the additional height after analyzing this now conditional use
under the City Code process .... Petitioner's Brief, at 9.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUP A) allows judicial review of an approval
or denial of a land use application for an affected person, as provided for in the Idaho
Administrative Procedur[e] Act (IDAP A)." In re Jerome County Board of Commissioners,
153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2012). "For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA
decisions, a local agency making a land use decision is treated as a government agency
under IDAPA." Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 75, 156
P.3d 573, 576 (2007).
"This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the [local agency] as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact.'' In re Jerome County, 281 P.3d at 1085. "This
Court will defer to the [agency's] findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous;
these factual determinations of the board are binding on a reviewing court when supported
by substantial and competent evidence in the record, even if there was conflicting evidence
before the [agency]." Id.
"This court shall ... affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of constitutional or
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon
unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Id., at 1085-86.
"A party that challenges a[n agency's] decision must demonstrate first that the
[agency] erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3), next the party must show that.one
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of its substantial rights has been prejudiced." Id., at 1086. "'Planning and zoning decisions
are entitled to a strong presumption of validity; this includes the [agency's] application and
interpretation of their own zoning ordinances."' Id. This Court will defer to a[n agency's]
'interpretation and application of its zoning ordinance, unless such interpretation or
application is capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory."' Id.

ANALYSIS
Lusk asserts the following contentions in this petition: (1) "the decision to grant the
conditional use request, and the Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision,
was in excess of the City Code's authority of the P&Z Commission and the Council;" (2)
"the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the Council's
refusal to overturn the P &Z Commission decision, was made upon unlawful procedure;" (3)
the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use request, and the Council's
refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was not supported by substantial
evidence in the record;" (4) "the P&Z Commission's decision to grant the conditional use
request, and the Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion;" (5) "the 'Reason for the Decision' [i]ssued by the P&Z Commission
and approved as modified by the Council were inadequate under LLUP A and City Code, and
thereby violated Petitioner's due process rights." Petitioner's Brief, at 7.

1. Standing
Before addressing the issues raised by Lusk, the Court must first address the City's
contention that the petitioner does not have standing "under LC. § 67-6521 to seek judicial
review of the City Council's approval of the River Edge CUP." Respondent City of Boise's
Brief Opposing Petition for Judicial Review, at 5. The City asserts that Lusk lacks standing
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because it cannot show "real or substantial harm to [its] property due to City Council's
approval of the River Edge CUP." Id., at 7.
Lusk asserts that "[t]he most immediate, real, significant, and anticipated adverse
consequence to Petitioner and other property owners in the neighborhood (including the
public who travel to and use Ann Morrison Park) is the parking crisis created by the City's
approval of an additional two stories of habitable apartments over and above the allowed
height of thirty-five feet in the R-OD zone - all without appropriate conditions being placed
on the conditional use request to ensure that adverse impacts are mitigated. In fact, there was
no discussion, no analysis, and no deliberation by the City to review the potential adverse
parking impacts caused by this [sic] additional habitable apartments that are not allowed by
right under the Zoning Ordinance." Petitioner's Brief, at 14.
"One 'fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence' is 'that a person wishing to
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing.' The three most basic pr?positions of the
doctrine of standing that our Court uses to guide its decisions [are] ... (1) that standing
'focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have
adjudicated;' (2) that in order 'to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing,
litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood
that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury;' and (3) that 'a
citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one
suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction. Building upon these basic
propositions, this Court also considers that standing 'may be predicated upon a threatened
harm as well as a past injury."' In re Jerome County, 281 P.3d at 1086.
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"Idaho Code section 67-6521(l)(d) allows an 'affected person aggrieved by a
decision' to seek judicial review ... An affected person is one who has 'an interest in real
property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing
the development.' LC. § 67-6521(l)(a) ... 'an affected person shall mean one having a bona
fide interest in real property which may be adversely affected by: (i) (t)he approval, denial or
failure to act upon an application required or authorized pursuant to this chapter."' Id., at
1087.
"An affected person shall mean one having a bona fide interest in real property which
may be adversely affected by: (i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon an application
for a subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other similar applications required or
authorized pursuant to this chapter." LC.§ 67-6521(1)(i).
LC. § 67-6512 provides: "(a) As part of a zoning ordinance each governing board
may provide by ordinance adopted, amended, or repealed in accordance with the notice and
hearing procedures provided under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, for the processing of
applications for special or conditional use permits."
"Notwithstanding jurisdictional boundaries, notice shall also be provided to property
owners or purchasers of record within the land being considered, three hundred (300) feet of
the external boundaries of the land being considered, and any additional area that may be
substantially impacted by the proposed special use as determined by the commission. Any
property owner entitled to specific notice pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall
have a right to participate in public hearings before a planning commission, planning and
zoning commission or governing board." LC.§ 67-6512(b).
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Lusk was entitled to specific notice of the proposed conditional use permit, due to the
proximity of its property with the proposed project. See Agency Record (hereinafter cited as
BC) BC-81. "917 Lusk LLC ('Keynetics'), owns the Keynetics Inc. building situated
immediately east and south of the proposed River Edge Apartment student housing project at
1004 W. Royal Boulevard .... " BC-81. See also BC-160 (photo showing that 917 Lusk's
property is adjacent to the proposed apartment project). In addition, "Lusk ... appeal[ed] the
Planning and Zoning Commission approval of a height exception to construct a five story
multi-family residential building on 3.42 acres located at 1004 W. Royal Boulevard in an ROD (Residential Office with Design Review) zone." BC-69. In its appeal, Lusk specifically
argued that "the proposed project will place an undue burden on transportation and other
public facilities in the vicinity"3 and "the proposed project will adversely affect other
property in the vicinity."4 BC-84.
The Court finds that Lusk is "[a]n affected person aggrieved by a final decision
concerning matters identified in section 67-5721(1)(a) ... [entitled to] seek judicial review
as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." LC. § 67-6521(1)(d). Lusk clearly has
3

"Parking problems created by the higher density associated with the height of the proposed Project will strain
public facilities in the area. Ann Morrison Park, a City owned park, will be clogged with overflow parking.
Visitors to the park will not be able to locate parking, and the City will be forced to expend valuable resources
policing parking areas within the park and along the Greenbelt. As was noted by the City of Boise in its new
comprehensive plan, Blueprint Boise, 'while many places are tempted to relax standards during uncertain
economic times, our high expectations will hold value many decades later.' The City should resist pressure to
make decisions now that will hinder the redevelopment of the area due to impacts of this Project on the
attractiveness of the immediate vicinity and the Greenbelt." BC-84.
4

"lnadeqi.iate parking provided by the proposed Project will severely affect nearby properties ... the request for
a height exception that is nearly twice allowed in the R-OD zone cannot be separated from parking concerns.
Each added story increases occupant density and the need for additional parking. Because the housing Project
would include 175 dwelling units (of which 139 are four-bedroom units), it will contain 622 bedrooms and
house at least 622 student tenants, yet only 280 parking spaces are planned. The application was improperly
processed as 'multi-family' for purposes of calculating off-street parking requirements. This is a significant
error because 'multi-family' projects under the City's off-street parking requirements must include only 1.5
parking spaces per dwelling unit and one guest space per IO units . . . The leasing arrangement further
demonstrates that the proposed Project is not typical multi-family housing, where the lease covers the entire
apartment and not, as in this case, a lease for each individual bedroom ... each unit is a bedroom under the
leasing arrangement." BC-84-85.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 7
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standing for purposes of seeking judicial review here. See also Hawkins v. Bonneville

County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) ("To
have a standing in a land-use case, the petitioner needs to allege, not prove, only that the
development could potentially harm his ... real estate interests."); Davisco. Foods Int'l, Inc.

v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 116 (2005) (possible odor from several miles
away conferred standing.).

2. Authority/Procedure Challenge
Lusk's first contention is that "the decision to grant the conditional use request, and
the Council's refusal to overturn the P&Z Commission decision, was in excess of the City
Code's authority of the P&Z Commission and the Council." Petitioner's Brief, at 7.
Lusk cites LC. § 67-6512(a), wherein it is stated that "[a] special use permit may be
granted to an applicant if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the terms of the
ordinance, subject to the ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to
provide services for proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan."
Lusk appears to argue that the city's approval of the conditional use permit lacked
authority because this approval was not "contingent on conditions of approval that would
mitigate the adverse impacts of the conditional use." Petitioner's Brief, at 17.
Lusk then goes on to argue, bringing in its other issues, that "the P&Z Commission
erred by not following the city's conditional use procedure," as well as its contentions that
the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious and not adequately supported or
supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Lusk argues "[t]he language of City Code Section 11-06-04.14.C reqmres an
examination of the off-street parking for any conditional use permit application. The P&Z

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 8
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Commission must consider all of the particulars of the proposed Project, including parking,
and, as necessary, attach conditions of approval regarding off-street parking ... the P&Z
Commission did not go through that exercise but made the conclusory statement that there
was adequate parking in order for Applicant to get the most units out of the site as possible."

Id., at 19-20.
The P&Z decision approving the conditional use permit, dated March 6, 2012,
provides that "[t]he additional height does not increase the density of the project to the point
where parking standards cannot be met ... [t]he height exception will not place an undue
burden on transportation and other public facilities ... The project is next to the greenbelt
that allows a direct walking/biking path that is ¼ mile from BSU ... [t]he height exception
allows for the applicant to maximize the number of units, while providing adequate parking .
. .. " March 6, 2012 Planning & Zoning Commission decision (CPUll-00090 & CFHll00036 I 1004 W. Royal Boulevard), at 3 (BC-108).
The P&Z held a hearing prior to issuing its approval decision, on March 5, 2012. The
hearing minutes note that "[Lusk's] letter ends by stating that there is also a shortage of
parking and that this issue cannot be separated from the height exception. This building is a
multi-family dwelling unit and meets our Parking Code. This issue is not before the
Commission tonight. The application tonight only concerns the additional height requested
by the applicant." March 5, 2012 Hearing Minutes, at 1 (BC-112) (Josh Johnson - planning
department).
During the hearing, Becky McKay (Engineering Solutions, Applicant Team) stated
that "[w]e meet all the parking requirements. They have 1.5 spaces, plus 1 per 10 units, with
a total of280 spaces. We meet that." (BC-114).
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Eileen Barber, "an owner and co-founder of Keynetics," testified:
Part of the issue is since they are doing 4-bedroom units, which is virtually
unheard of in multi-family housing; true multi-family housing consists
primarily of 1 and 2-bedroom units. If they actually have all of those as 2bedroom, not even a mixture of one and two, they would have 311-units and
there would be about 500 parking spaces. The fact they have quads and are
calling this multi-family housing means the project is terribly under parked.
This project should not be classified as multi-family. College students living
together are not families. There is nothing in the Boise City Code that fits
this type of use. I suggest the City consider creating a new residential
category for private off-campus housing. This is new to Boise. The issue with
the proposed five floors and the issue of inadequate parldng are the result of
a density that deserves a more in-depth examination. Boise only has four
people per acre. That comes right from the census data. Portland is close to 7
and Seattle is a little over 11. BC-121. (emphasis added).
Kate Lenz, Human Resources Director at Keynetics, stated "I just don't see how
there is ample allocations for cars and bikes for these future students, with the proposal that
is front of you." Id.
Makho N gazimbi testified that he had lived at a nearby apartment complex (Morrison
Park Apartments) since 2008. He works at Keynetics and was a BSU student. He agreed that
"this development would be a great benefit to the city." However, his
[M]ain concern is the pressure that this development will have on the already
limited parking in that part of town. From what I understand the maximum
capacity would be about 600 people and they will be providing parking for
about 45 percent ... Chances are the overflow will end up being on Lusk
Street, Dale, Island and Royal, which are all streets in that area . . . I think
they tried to emphasize what they do is encourage people not to own
vehicles. I don't know how you can do that in Boise ... I would urge you to
consider the impact of this development on surrounding neighborhoods. BC121-122.
Brad Wiskirchsen, CEO of Keynetics, testified:
The proposal you have before you is clearly not a multi-family housing
development. It's aimed at students by their own admissions. In fact, it more
appropriate fits in with the City's definition offraternity or sorority type of
living situation, although 622 residents would make an awfully large
fraternity ... We're not opposed to the development of this particular parcel.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 10
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In fact, we are excited to welcome new neighbors and say goodbye to the
truck lot, but ... we're asking the development of the property be done right
and given consideration of the impacts and influx of people in the
surrounding areas, including the property's neighbors, and more importantly,
the City's own assets, the Boise River and Ann Morrison Park. BC-123.
(emphasis added).
Dave Kangas, President of the Vista Neighborhood Association, also testified:
[O]ne of the biggest problems we have with multi-family housing is parking.
Planning and Zoning will admit that their ordinance does not adequately
address parking. When you look at a proposal, most multi-family housing
comes in at two bedrooms and they are allowed so many spots considering
that formula. If you're going to one bedroom apartment, you have to realize
that there's probably a couple living there and there's going to be two cars.
If you have quads and you're gearing towards Boise State students, you're
·going to have four vehicles and four bikes. That's what they're going to
have. That's how they get around. From everything I've heard if there's a
proposed 600 residents and they are allowed 45 bike spaces, give me a
break. You're imposing big problems on every other business in that area for
parking. I love the building. I think it's a unique location and a nice
replacement for that industrial park, but if you have 600 people coming in
and out of that apartment in the summertime when Ann Morrison Park is full
of rafters, that whole shoreline from that building from the bridge, all the
way through the park is going to be trashed by people coming in and out of
the river ... The parking addressed by the people who have already testified
is a major issue with multi-family housing throughout the City and all the
neighborhood associations will testify to that, I would think because that is
one of the biggest problems in the neighborhoods. BC-124.
Monika Anderson testified that she lives next to BSU and "parking is a problem. I
have two roommates and have proper parking for them ... Everybody I know has a car. I
have two." Id.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Commissioner Stevens said: "I want to remind the
Commissioners that tlie parking issue is not actually before us. This Commission is not in
position to make findings that require our applicant to be held to standards above that which
is in our code. That would be arbitrary and would make the City be in some serious hot
water, so I want to make sure that when we have our discussion tonight, we keep tlie

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 11

000121

parking out of it. It is not before us. !hey have met code and to require that is above and
beyond what we are allowed to do." BC-126. 5 (emphasis added).
The commission later voted, unanimously, to approve the conditional use permit.
"This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. The language of the statute is
to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to rules of statutory interpretation."

State v. Salinas, 150 Idaho 771, 772, 250 P.3d 822, 823 (Ct. App. 2011). Statutes are
interpreted so that the parts make sense of the whole. See Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115
Idaho 266,270, 766 P.2d 736, 740 (1988).
Boise City Code Section 11-06-04.01 (Conditional Use Permits - "Justification")
states "[c]onditional uses by definition possess characteristics such as to require review and
appraisal by the Commission to determine whether or not the use would cause any damage,
hazard, nuisance or other detriment to persons or property in the vicinity." (emphasis added).
Boise City Code Section 11-06-04.13 (Conditional Use Permits - "Criteria and
Findings") "The Commission, following the procedures outlined below, may approve a
conditional use permit when the evidence presented at the hearing is such as to establish: A.
That the location of the proposed use is compatible to other uses in the general
neighborhood; and B. That the proposed use will not place an undue burden on

5

See also BC-126 (Commissioner Storey: "Like you said parking is off the table. This complies. I ca11't say our
code is correct 011 parki11g am/ tile way it should be ha11d/ed ....") (emphasis added), (Commissioner
Bradbury: "I agree with Commissioner Storey, I think he is correct in ... what our job is tonight."); Boise City
Council Meeting Minutes, 04-17-12_2, at 36 (Council Member McLean: "There is a parking issue we do need
to deal with as a City and we've talked about that a little bit and I hope to see that come forward soon.").
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 12
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transportation and other public facilities in the vicinity; and C. That the site is large enough
to accommodate the proposed use and all yards, open spaces, pathways, walls and fences,
parking ... and such other features as are required by this title ... D. That the proposed use,
if it complies with all conditions imposed, will not adversely affect other property of the
vicinity .... "
Boise City Code Section 11-06-04.14 (Conditional Use Permits - "Conditional Use;
Limitations"), states that "[t]he Commission, in acting upon the application, shall provide
that approval of a conditional use permit shall be contingent upon compliance with specified
conditions, including but not limited to the following matters . . . C. Volume of traffic
generated, requirements for off-street parking . . . vehicular movements within the site and
points of vehicular ingress and egress." (emphasis added).
Lusk argues that the alleged failure to consider parking as part of the approval
procedure, both before the P&Z and the City Council, was a procedural ·violation of both the
conditional use ordinance and due process rights. The Court finds that Lusk's contention is
in error. It is clear from the record that both P&Z and the Council considered the parking
issue. Indeed, P&Z reopened the hearing before it to allow presentations on parking by
Lusk's witnesses.

However, both determined that the project as proposed in the CUP

application met the existing code requirement for parking.

It was further noted that the

project was within walking distance for students and that bicycle parking was provided.
Since both the P&Z and the Council determined that the project met the current code
requirements, they determined that there was no need to address the issue further. Although
some questioned the adequacy of the code itself, it is not within this Court's purview in this
case to tell the City what the codes should contain. There were no procedural or due process
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violations here. Likewise, the Court sees no abuse of discretion here, and clearly both P&Z
and the Council acted within their authority.
Finally, the Court concludes that Lusk has failed to demonstrate that any other of its
claimed substantial rights have been violated. There is an allegation that the public parking
situation may be adversely impacted by the project, but there are no allegations that Lusk's
property, the use of the property, or its business could be. Rather, Lusk appears to assert that
parking by tenants of the project could impact the entire area, including Ann Morrison Park,
but makes no specific argument on its own substantial rights.
The city contends that "P &Z was never required, by the plain language of the
ordinance, to condition the River Edge CUP on Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14. This is
especially true in light of the parking standards set forth in Boise City Code§ 11-10-01.01,
Table 1, which were applicable to and met by Intervenor." Respondent City of Boise's Brief
Opposing Petition for Judicial Review, at 12 n.47.
Boise City Code Section 11-10-01 ("General Parking Standards") provides that
"[t]his chapter establishes standards for motor vehicle and bicycle parking, on-site
circulation, loading areas and parking lot design . . . C. The number of required spaces is
based on the primary use of the site." Lusk has never contended that the proposed project
does not meet the parking requirements of the applicable zoning ordinance.
All parties request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-11 7. That
statute mandates an award to the prevailing party in any proceeding involving a state agency
or political subdivision if the Court finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in law or fact. Lusk is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to fees.
The Court cannot find, however, that it acted without a reasonable basis in law because of
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the differing views presented as to the interaction between the ordinances setting parking
standards and the ordinance governing CUP applications.

Therefore, attorney fees are

denied to the City and Royal.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the order of the City Council is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

2,b~ day of May 2013.
athryn
Sticklen
Senior District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
company,
)
)
)
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF BOISE CITY, a political
subdivision in the State of Idaho,
Respondent,
and
ROYAL BOULEYARD AS SOCIATES,
LP, an Idaho limited partnership,
Intervenor/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-OC-2012-08871

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)

-------------~)

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, CITY OF BOISE CITY AND ITS
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 150 N. CAPITOL
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BOULEVARD, 4TH FLOOR, BLDG. 2, BOISE, IDAHO 83702, AND ROYAL BOULEVARD
ASSOCIATES, LP, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, GARY G. ALLEN AND
DEBORAH E. NELSON, GIVENS PURSLEY LLP, 601 W. BANNOCK STREET, BOISE,
IDAHO 83702, AND THE CLERK AND THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, 917 Lusk, LLC, appeals against the above-named

Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Court and Memorandum Decision and Order,
entered in the above-entitled action on the 31 st day of May 2013, Honorable Senior District
Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen presiding.
2.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Court and

Memorandum Decision and Order described in Paragraph 1 above is appealable under and
pursuant to Rule ll(f) I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that Appellant intends to assert in

the appeal follows, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent Appellant from
asserting issues on appeal:
(a)

Whether the District Court erred in determining the Boise Planning and

Zoning Commission and the Boise City Council correctly considered parking as part of
the approval procedure.
(b)

Whether the District Court erred in determining the application met the

Boise City Code requirements for conditional use permits.
(c)

Whether the District Court erred in determining the actions of the Boise

Planning and Zoning Commission and the Boise City Council met the requirements of
the Boise City Code.
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(d)

Whether the District Court erred in determining the Appellant did not

suffer prejudice to its substantial rights.
(e)

Whether the District Court erred in not determining whether the Boise

City Council failed to provide Findings that Complied with Idaho Code§ 67-6535.
4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No.

(b)

Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript: No transcript is requested.
6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.:
•

05/l 7/2012 - Petition for Judicial Review

•

08/02/2012 - Petitioner's Brief

•

08/30/2012 - Respondent City of Boise's Brief Opposing Petition for
Judicial Review

•

08/30/2012 - Intervenor Royal Boulevard Associates LP's Response
Brief

•

09/20/2012 - Reply Brief

•

05/31/2013 - Memorandum Decision and Order

In requesting inclusion of the foregoing documents in the clerk's record, Appellant anticipates
the entirety of the record and transcripts of the City of Boise Planning and Zoning Commission
and the Boise City Council, as filed or lodged with the District Court, will be lodged with the
Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 31, I.AR.
7.

I certify:
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a

•

(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: NIA
Name and address:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Name and address:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (b)

[ ] That the Clerk of the District Court or administrative agency has been

paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

[X] That Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee

because no transcript is requested.
(d)

[X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's

record has been paid.
(e)

[ ] That Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record because _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(f)

[X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(g)

[ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because

(h)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20 (and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho
Code).
DATED this 12th day of July 2013.
SPINK BUTLER, LLP

By:

¥ .>

\ \_, L, ...-:1('

Richard H. Andrus
Attorneys for Appellant
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[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

Gary G. Allen
Deborah E. Nelson
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208/388-1300

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

~ \ _ } - , ---_/2../ Richard H. Andrus
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,
Peitioner-Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 41214
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
CITY OF BOISE, a political subdivision in
the State of Idaho,
Respondent,
and
ROYAL BOULEVARD ASSOCIATES,
LP, an Idaho limited partnership,
Intervenor-Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Administrative Record in a Judicial Review.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 19th day of August, 2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

917 LUSK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,
Peitioner-Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 41214
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
CITY OF BOISE, a political subdivision in
the State of Idaho,
Respondent,
and
ROYAL BOULEVARD ASSOCIATES,
LP, an Idaho limited partnership,
Intervenor-Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
12th day of July, 2013.
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